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ABSTRACT
In August of 1905, American newspapers reported that the Greek Orthodox
Bishop of the American Antioch, Rafa’el Hawaweeny, asked his Syrian migrant
congregation to lay down their lives for him and kill two prominent Maronite
newspaper editors in Little Syria, New York. The sectarian fragmentation of the
Syrian migrant community led to street riots in the following months. This event
has been brushed aside in Syrian Diasporic historiography, which is scarce to
begin with. This project focuses on the lived experience of Syrian migrants in
Little Syria between 1880 and 1905. The goal was to show how sectarianism
was reproduced in Little Syria behind the fagade of a monolithic national
community. This has been done by analyzing events like the street riot that
took place on September 18th, 1905, New York newspapers, and Syrian
diasporic newspapers. After thorough analysis of these sources, it becomes
evident that the xenophobia faced by the Syrian migrant community forced
them to turn inward to survive. The vulnerability of the community was
manipulated by competitive members of the cosmopolitan elite, who sought to
influence and guide the community. The literary cosmopolitan elite reproduced
sectarianism through print media in order to destroy their rivals. Sectarian
divisions reproduced by Syrian diasporic newspapers led to newspaper wars,
which escalated to street riots when Bishop Hawaweeny was caught between
the cross-fires. Through emphasizing the power of print-capitalism, this
research highlights the importance of xenophobia in shaping multiple,
overlapping identities in the Syrian diaspora, allowing sectarianism to
reproduce and prosper.
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F orew ord
On September 11th, 2001, American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the western
end Pentagon by five hijackers affiliated with Al-Qaeda, a militant Islamic
organization. There were fourteen additional hijackers on three other planes. Two
places crashed into the Twin Towers o f the World Trade Center in New York. The
third plane was meant to crash in Washington D.C, but the passengers of United
Airlines Flight 93 overcame hijackers and the plane crashed into a field in
Pennsylvania. The horrendous events of that day led to a nation-wide panic, as the
American society redefined what it meant to be a Middle Eastern immigrant in the
United States. Violent attacks against Middle Eastern descendants were wide spread.
Americans with brown/olive skin-complexions were denounced as “terrorists.”
In reaction to the growing unrest, some Lebanese-descendants living in the
United States began considering themselves Phoenician or French. Phoenician and
French ancestry was more attractive than Arab ancestry, because of their glorious
histories as advanced civilizations. Identifying with a more glorious imagined past was
not an isolated incident for Lebanese migrants, but a pattern of reaction to Western
xenophobia in attempt to authenticate themselves and their enterprising talents in their
adopted homelands.1 Asher Kaufman suggests that the myth of Phoenician ancestry
also reflected the attempt to illustrate the Lebanese contribution to Western society,
since Phoenician civilization contributed to Ancient Greek civilization due to its

1 See Theresa Alfaro-Velcamp, So F ar fro m Allah, So Close to M exico: M id d le Eastern Im m igrants in
M o d e rn M exico (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 134-138.
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monopolization of Mediterranean trade.2 In the first decade of the twentieth century,
journalist Victor Berard argues that Hellenic religion and mythology were of Semitic
origin, crediting the Phoenicians as the cradle of Western civilization. Lebanese
nationalists adopted Berard’s theory to justify Lebanon as a nation. Lebanese
immigrants throughout the mahjar adopted the Phoenician myth as well, to justify
themselves to their neighbors during times of unrest.
In the moments o f intense xenophobia against Syrian migrants, migrant
identities became complex. The identities which shaped and fragmented the Syrian
migrant community temporarily decreased in importance in order to effectively defend
the community. These identities were shaped according to religion, sect, and place of
origin. Events following September 11th united all the sects of the Arab immigrant
community in the United States (Sunni, Shi’a, Druze, Maronite, Melkite, and Greek
Orthodox) as they were threatened by their neighbors and followed by Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) agents. Although they presented a united front through their
origin of ancestry, they maintained their underlying sectarian divisions by remaining
socially isolated from one another. Sectarianism is the loyal adherence to one’s
religious subdivision, which encourages intense bigotry and discrimination against
other sects.
Sectarian conflict is not a new phenomenon and sectarianism is not a “buzz
word” to describe the events occurring in the Middle East today. There is a long
history of sectarian solidarity and conflict in the region as different sectarian groups
vied for political power. There were three major civil wars in Lebanon (1860, 1956,

2 Asher Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia: The Search f o r Id en tity in Lebanon (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 78.
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and 1975) which were due to the imbalance of political powers attributed to the
differing sectarian populations. All of these civil wars devastated the Lebanese
population and forced mass migrations.3 The immigrants did not shed their sectarian
identity when they added their new mahjar (diasporic) identity and reinforced their
national identity. These identities sometimes fragmented the community and would
often unite the community in the face of foreign threat.
The violent events following September 11th were not the first time sectarian
identities were set aside within the Syrian diaspora. These recurrent themes began over
a century ago in Little Syria, New York, as the first wave of Syrians emigrated from
the Ottoman Empire.4 These Syrian immigrants were ushered into the United States
through Castle Garden in Battery, New York. In 1890, Ellis Island replaced Castle
Garden as the immigration center for Atlantic immigration to the United States. Syrian
immigrants looked to the Little Syria neighborhood along Washington Street as their
“mother colony,” because it was their first point of contact to the United States.
Naturally, Little Syria was the largest Syrian immigrant colony in the United States.5
By 1892, the colony had grown large enough to necessitate the publication of the first
Arabic newspaper in the mahjar, Kawkab America.6

3 In 1860 there w as no Lebanon and thus m asses o f th e now Lebanese geographical area were
considered th e Syrian province of the Ottoman Empire.
4 Since this thesis is focusing on th e tim e period betw een 1890 and 1 9 1 7 ,1will use the term Syrian to
describe th e immigrants since th e region they emigrated from was th e Syrian province and m ost of the
migrants considered them selves Syrian. I recognize that this is problematic, especially after the
form ation of Lebanon, because it d oes not always correspond with the political affiliation of the
immigrants them selves.
5 Philip Hitti, The Syrians in A m erica (New York: Doran, 1924), 66.
6 Translated to mean Planet America. Other sources have translated to Star America, but they are
wrong.
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This work focuses on the multiple identities in Little Syria during the period of
1890-1905. This research analyzes how sectarianism was important to the
immigrants, but it would be muffled when there were foreign or domestic threats to
Syrian communities. This research does not follow a story of assimilation into the
mahjar, unlike many Syrian diasporic histories. This is a narrative o f multiple
overlapping identities in immigrant communities. Identity is accepted as a monolithic
phenomenon in these types of communities, when, in fact, the communities have
internal divisions based on class, regional, and religious differences transpiring from
their homeland. Hegemony due to ancestral commonalities overshadows these factions
for a short period of time, when the community confronts a foreign threat. This
research is most relevant to show how sectarian identities transpire into the Syrian
diaspora and what lessons can we learn from these historical processes. It also presents
how the Syrian people have been able to put aside these sectarian identities for the
good of their community. Although this is not a study o f Islamic sects, it is relevant
because the Christian sects in the Middle East struggle against one another for political
dominance today. This may be a narrative o f identities in the Syrian colony of New
York, but it can be broadened to exemplify the multiple identities in the entire Syrian
diaspora and can apply to other diasporas as well.
Beginning in 1880s, there was an infusion of stars and stripes as the Syrian
immigrants landed in Castle Gardens and adopted an American identity. Although
they accepted this new mahjar, they did not become a homogeneous community as
Syrian-Americans, but rather built their sectarian identities in the mahjar.

4

Introduction
A sense of romanticism lingers along the exotic Washington Street, where red
fezzes bob up and down as olive-skinned people hurry about. Peddlers speed off on
bikes, rushing to sell their Jerusalem-made goods and lace. Along the street, men
smoke out of long water pipes and drink Turkish coffees at the quaint cafes. Small
shops have exotic symbols hanging from their doors and sell dry groceries, glass
bracelets, swords, lamps, water pipes, and native alcohol. These same symbols are
seen on circulating newspapers which appear to be read backwards. Restaurants serve
variations of dishes with different parts of lamb and raw lamb. People live crammed in
tenement dens of “grime and order.”7 The year is 1899 in the Syrian quarter of New
York City, where about 3,000 were residing.
During the Great Migration of 1880 to 1914, there was a peak of immigration
to the United States.8 The best known of these immigrants are the Italians and the
Greeks, whereas the 90,000 Syrian immigrants are neglected by the majority of
scholars. The majority of the Syrian migrants in the United States were Christians,
most being Greek Orthodox and Maronite. Syrians emigrated for three main reasons:
to escape conscription into the Ottoman Army, the sectarian tensions that burdened the
Syrian province, and the promise of economic opportunities in the United States.
Ottoman Syrian immigrants settled throughout the Americas, Australia, Europe, and

7 Cromwell Childe, "New York's Syrian Quarter," N e w York Times, August 2 0 ,1 8 9 9 .
8 Many people attribute th e Great Migration to the migration of African Americans from below to
Mason-Dixon Line to Northern Cities. However this period w as th e greatest peak of international
immigration to th e United States as well. For this purpose I will use th e term Great Migration to also
include external immigration.
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the Caribbean, but the majority settled along the East Coast in major cities such as
Boston, New York, and Philadelphia.
The Syrian immigrants were very diverse in the workforce after emigrating.
Many of the earliest settlers were recruited by shop owners to be peddlers, linking
them to a transnational commerce system. Syrian migrants saw greater profit in
peddling Jerusalem-made goods rather than working in factories like the Eastern
European immigrants.9 Peddling also did not require much training, capital or
language skills. This allowed for women and children to join the diasporic economy
by peddling lace and buttons. Syrian peddlers tirelessly bicycled manufactured goods
from the supply centers in New York’s Little Syria to vast geographical regions in the
Americas, bridging the chasm between industrial New York and the rural American
countryside. These peddlers brought manufactured goods to the farmer’s front door,
transforming rural inhabitants into consumers. Housewives came to rely on them and
their flexible payment plans.10 Mexican rebels and soldiers also relied on the Syrian
peddlers during the Mexican Revolution, because these peddlers were able to cross the
United States-Mexican Border to smuggle dry goods and guns back into Mexico. The
peddlers sold these scarce goods to the Mexicans.11 However, peddling was
considered a menial job, reserved only for the lowest-class.

9 Peddlers would make about $1,000 annually w hereas factory workers averaged about $650 annually.
See Alixa Naff, Becoming Am erican and the Early A rab Im m ig ra n t Experience (Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1993).
10 Ibid, 125
11 See Theresa Alfaro-Velcamp. So Far fro m . Allah, So Close to M exico: M id d le Eastern Im m igrants in
M o d e rn M exico (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), for more about th e role of Syrian Peddlers
during the Mexican Revolution.
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Most Syrian immigrants who began peddling eventually aspired be shop
owners. Most did succeed in establishing their own shops and some built factories. By
1924, thirty-five kimono manufacturers on Washington Street were owned by Syrian
immigrants and there were twenty-five Syrian-owned silk factories in New Jersey.
Some immigrants immediately set up their shops with Oriental-made goods in the
mahjar. Migrants used their kin trade networks throughout the diaspora to maintain the
importation of their goods. These diasporic kin networks extended from the Ottoman
Empire to Egypt to Canada, Colonial French West Africa, North America, South
America, and the Caribbean. The Canadian and Mexican kinship networks allowed for
smuggling of products and people across the border. As borders solidified against
Syrian immigration in the 1920s and 1930s, Syrian migrants became more creative in
their smuggling endeavors. Peddlers used French passports to move freely across the
borders after Syrian territory became a French Mandate. Syrians also used these
methods to smuggle countrymen into Jamaica and Trinidad, which specifically barred
Syrian migrants. Syrian shop owners maintained their kin networks to be successful,
and imported Syrian-made goods (including diasporic newspapers and literature)
throughout the mahjar.
Those who did not become merchants in the mahjar may have been restaurant
owners, butchers, brokers, or hair dressers. When Syrian Sunni Muslims began
migrating at higher volumes, most chose to work in the Detroit industrial plants. The
highest migrant socio-economic class was the cosmopolitan literate elite, which was
made up of writers, newspaper owners, and professors in Little Syria. The first Syrian
migrant family to settle in the United States, the Arbeely family, constructed the
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cosmopolitan migrant elite in the diaspora. The descendants of Doctor Arbeely
became doctors and translators. They also founded Syrian aid associations and the
Kawkab America newspaper. The Arbeely brothers influenced the Syrian immigrant
masses, as the first point of contact into the United States. Najib Arbeely worked as a
translator for the Bureau of Immigration in attempt to ease the migration process for
Syrians. N a’um Mokarzel, Najib Diab, and other newspaper owners also became part
of this elite as they used their newspapers to connect the mahjar and influence the
masses. Other members of the Syrian elite were famous writers like Ameen Rihany
and Khalil Gibran, whose literary works are popular in American society today. The
cosmopolitan elite resided in New York, the center of American culture and print
capitalism.
The largest Syrian immigrant colony was on Washington Street in Manhattan’s
Lower West Side.12 This area was called “Little Syria” by New Yorkers and “Ahl alShmal” by the Syrian inhabitants.13 Renaming the street after their motherland and the
Arab-styled shops proved the New York newspapers correct when they reported that
the residents of Washington Street maintained their Syrian identity, customs,
garments, and ways of thinking. Syrians crossed the Atlantic Ocean, with their
sectarian solidarities and strife, to settle along the American East Coast. The sectarian

12 New York newspapers, such as th e New York Tribune and the Sun w ere calling th ese immigrant
enclaves colonies. The first being the New York Tribune in 1892. See "A Picturesque Colony: Syrians
Settled in the First War," The N e w York Tribune, October 2 ,1 8 9 2 . Ahl al-Shm al translates to mean
people of th e North or Syria
13 The exact parameters of Little Syria are difficult to determ ine. It included th e intersection with
Rector Street, Greenwich Street. Little Syria d oes not exist today, m ost of its residence moved to
Atlantic Avenue by 1945 after th e construction of th e Brooklyn Battery tunnel destroyed m ost of the
neighborhood.

identities transpired from the motherland and took shape in the United States in the
immigrant communities. Ninety-five percent of the immigrants were of Christian sects
(Greek Orthodox, Maronite, and Melkite), the other five percent made up Druze and
Muslim (Sunni and Shiite) sects.14 Sectarianism in the colonies first presented itself as
a race to establish and strengthen their different congregations. Each congregation
raised funds to pay for the travels and salary for priests of their respective church from
Syria. These priests would then construct churches in the mahjar.
After churches were constructed, sectarianism took the most public form
through community newspaper affiliations in Little Syria: Al- Bayyan was a
newspaper for the Druze inhabitants, Mir at al-Gharb (Mirror o f the West), Kawkab
America (Planet America), and al- Kalimah (The Word) were the newspapers
targeting the Greek Orthodox inhabitants, and al-Hoda (The Guidance) was a
Maronite (Catholic) based newspaper. Arabic newspapers circulated the diaspora to
keep immigrants updated on the Ottoman Empire. Newspapers in Little Syria also
served to connect diasporic trade and family networks throughout the western
hemisphere. The editors of the Arabic newspapers in the diaspora sought to promote
their views of nationalism through print capitalism. They hoped to shape the politics
and culture of a Syrian country during the wave of nationalism occurring in the first
half of the twentieth century. Benedict Anderson famously defined nationalism as an
“imagined political community... imagined as inherently limited and sovereign.”15 In

15 Benedict Anderson, Im ag ined Com m unities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f N atio n alism
(London: Verso, 1991), 5.
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Imagined Communities, Anderson suggests that print capitalism created the
imagination of the national community through juxtaposition of local stories and
stories from other countries. Newspapers and literature made it possible for growing
numbers of people to think about themselves as a community by relating themselves to
other communities, thus constructing imaginary borders between themselves and
others.16
For Syrians in the diaspora, their newspapers imported and utilized their
vernacular Arabic language so that Syrian migrants would maintain their Syrian
identities and imagined connections to their homelands. The Syrian newspapers in the
diaspora also attempted to forge a modernized Syrian nation, acceptable to Western
ideals. Historian Akram Khater suggests that the newspaper editors sought to
modernize the Levant by teaching its readers the ways and habits of the civilized
West, as indicated by the name of the newspapers like M ir ’at al Gharb (The Mirror o f
the West) and al-Hoda (Guidance). Advice on fashion, children-rearing, social
etiquette, education, communal identity, and woman’s work were common themes
within the newspaper articles, to draw parallels between American values and Syrian
values.17 These articles aimed to influence the creation of national values in a new
Syrian nation.
The “Syrian” national identity was constructed in the mahjar as an imagined
socio-political collective identity due to the migrant experience in the diaspora. The
experience of the newcomer status and minority group in the Western world, against

16 Ibid, 35
17 Akram Fouad Khater, Inventing Hom e: Em igration, Gender, and the M id d le Class in Lebanon, 1 8 7 0 1 9 2 0 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 88
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the backdrop of Orientalism, constructed this imagined community in the diaspora.
The Syrian literature and newspapers gave the Syrian community a sense of pride of
common Syrian heritage and presented the migrants as a monolithic friendly
community. Ancestral ties in the mahjar were reinforced by the newspapers, which
allowed their readers consciousness o f the political debates in the Syrian province.
By keeping Syrian migrants informed about the news of the motherland, the
immigrants maintained their connection to Syria. The feeling of a collective unity with
Syrians dispersed in the diaspora as migrants raised funds for Syrian national causes.
This sense of nationalism only fueled in the wake of the Balkan wars, as the mahjar
newspapers and literary texts protested for an independent freed Syrian nation. Najib
Diab, editor of Mira ’at al-Gharb and the most prominent diasporic supporter for a free
Syria, attended the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 to represent Syria as a nation.
There was also a smaller, but prominent Lebanese nationalist group within the Syrian
diaspora, headed by the Philadelphia al-Hoda newspaper editor N a’um Mokarzel.
Mokarzel envisioned and lobbied for a separate Maronite Lebanese nation. He
attacked all the other Syrian diasporic newspaper writers who called for a Syrian
nation. Mokarzel maintained close ties with Francois Georges-Picot and attended the
Paris Peace Conference to advocate for the separate Lebanese nation.18 Syrian migrant
editors were so emotionally invested in diasporic nationalism that their newspapers led
to the divisions among the migrant communities based on their various views.

18 Hani Bawardi, The M ak in g o f A rab Am ericans: From Syrian N atio n alism to U.S. Citizenship (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 2014), 63.
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Print media also reproduced the sectarian collective identities imported from
the homeland. Mokarzel began multiple conflicts among the newspapers based upon
sectarianism and politics, attacking other newspapers who promoted inter-sectarian
relationships. Mokarzel hoped to promote his vision of a Maronite Lebanese nation
state, separate from Syria and the Ottoman Empire, through fostering sectarian conflict
in the diaspora. Mokarzel used his newspaper to attack Mira ’at al-Gharb and other
leaders of the Greek Orthodox Syrian community in the turn of the twentieth century.
One incident of Mokarzel’s bigotry led to a street fight on Washington Street in 1905
between the Maronites and the Greek Orthodox immigrants when he attacked the
Bishop of the Archdiocese, Rafa’el Hawaweeny.19
Syrian migrants united under a Syrian national identity whenever confronted
with a foreign threat, whether domestically or internationally. This is apparent when
they united to confront Irish immigrants and the American police when a group of
Irish immigrants denounced Syria. A skirmish ensued, ending with a Syrian woman in
the hospital. A united group of Syrians, from all sects, went to the police station to
demand protection. The immigrants united against the Ottoman Empire, calling for a
Free Syrian nation-state and formed many political groups in the Syrian Quarter to
send appeals to create a separate Syrian nation. This resentment o f the Ottoman
Empire spilled into the Syrian diaspora against the Turkish Muslim immigrants in
Little Syria. Syrian immigrants harassed the Turkish shop owners. When World War I
broke, the Syrian newspapers urged their communities to join the army to fight the
Ottoman oppressors and help create an independent Syrian nation. The third threat that

19 Rafa'el Hawaweeny is now referred to as Saint Rafa'el by the Greek Orthodox community.
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allowed Syrian immigrants to place their sectarian identities in the background in lieu
of their united Syrian identity was the threat of British and French intervention in
Syria, as each country supported different sectarian groups to exert their influence in
the region (the British supported the Druze and the French supported the Maronite),
leading to war and chaos.
Despite the image of a nationally unified migrant group, the sectarianism that
was imported into the Syrian diaspora continued to fragment the Syrian community.
The fragmentation of the community led to the constant calls by the literary
cosmopolitan elite to gap the chasms between the factions and unite for the nationalist
cause. Writers such as Kahlil Gibran and Ameen Rihany urged the Syrian community
to unite in order to free Syria from Ottoman rule and foreign influence. The elite also
united the migrant community against domestic threats. In these cases, sectarian
identities were only set aside, not destroyed.

Historiography
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw improvements in
transportation and the spread of industrialism, which led to a peak in transnational
migrations. Scholars have intensely researched many of the diasporas during in this
era of displacement, most notably the Irish, Jewish, and Italian diasporas. However,
migration patterns from the Syrian have been less visible in scholarly works, although
the Lebanese diaspora alone is estimated to be 8 million, and 4 million still reside in
Lebanon. Claiming to escape Ottoman tyranny, sectarian tensions, and military
conscription, early Syrian people emigrated from the Ottoman Empire to the
Americas, Europe, and West Africa. In the 1920s and 1930s, nation-states in the
13

Americas, Africa, and islands of the Caribbean passed exclusionary laws to prevent
further Syrian migrations.
The historiography of the Syrian diaspora began in opposition to the United
States Johnson-Reed Act of 1924, which excluded Syrian people from migrating to the
•United States. In 1925, Philip Hitti wrote Syrians in America to argue that Syrian
migrants can assimilate easily. The historiography of the Syrian diaspora and Syrian
political activism ceased until the exclusionary laws were repealed in the 1960s. The
suspension of the exclusionary laws and the fiery socio-political atmosphere of the
Civil Rights, anti-war and counter-culture movements o f the 1960s led to a celebration
of identity. Graduate students began to ask larger questions about social change in
history and the assimilation of immigrants. Within this context, scholars also
celebrated the notion of immigrant histories. While in graduate school in the 1960s,
Alixa N aff was interested in reconstructing the history of the Syrian migrant
community. She drove throughout the United States to collect artifacts, photographs,
and oral histories of early Syrian immigrants and donated these primary sources to the
Smithsonian. N a ff s collection revived the historiography of the Syrian diaspora. The
past decade has moved beyond Naff, to study the transnational and imperial effects of
the Syrian migrants. N aff repeats Hitti’s argument that the early Syrian migrants
assimilated and Americanized, unscathed by discrimination.20 N aff believed that
Syrian peddlers furthered American interests by bridging the chasm between the
industrious cities and the rural countryside by bringing manufactured products to their
doorsteps, so they were well-liked by their customers.

20Naff, 4.
14

Scholarship since N aff refutes her rosy picture of the migration experience.
Scholarship of the Syrian diasporic history has since recognized that xenophobia and
discrimination were essential realities of Syrian migrants. Gregory Orfaela and Jeffrey
Lesser contributed to N a ff s research by expanding upon the labor history of the
Syrian migrants. Orfaela and Lesser analyze the cultural lives of the peddlers, the
xenophobia they faced and how they assimilated to United States and Brazilian
societies.21 Theresa Alfaro-Velcamp refutes N aff s arguments that the Syrian migrants
assimilated; instead she suggests that acculturation occurred among the Syrian
migrants at varying rates in response to local xenophobia in Mexico. Velcamp
suggests that socio-economic success determined whether a migrant identified as
Syrio-Lebanese or Mexican. The successful migrants identified themselves as
Lebanese with Phoenician ancestry to justify their wealth, while the others either
acculturated their identities or identified solely as Mexican to combat xenophobia.
Velcamp is the first historian to attempt to create a transnational history of Syrian
migration, by identifying transnational economic and kin network of the migrants.22
Other historians of the Syrian diaspora focus on the racial xenophobia against
the immigrants, which helped to construct a global color-line.23 Sarah Gualtieri,

21For more information about the labor and assimilation histories of th e Syrian immigrants se e Naff;
Randa A. Kayyali, The A rab Am ericans (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2006); Jeffrey Lesser, N ego tiating
N a tio n a l Id en tity (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999); and Jeffrey Lesser, W elcom ing the
Undesirables (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
22 See Theresa Alfaro-Velcamp, So F ar From Allah, So Close to M exico: M id d le Eastern Im m igrants in
M o d e rn M exico (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007).
23 Henry Reynolds and Marilyn Lake, D raw in g the G lobal Colour Line: W h ite M e n 's Countries an d the
In te rn a tio n a l Challenge o f Racial Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
Although Lake and Reynold do not necessarily show how the Syrian migrants fit into the intellectual
d eb ates over w hiteness, th ese intellectual d eb ates led to the w aves of exclusionary acts in th e United
States, Canada, th e Caribbeans, South American countries, and even colonial French W est Africa in the
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Michael Suleiman, and John Tehranian analyzes the racial discriminations and
xenophobia the immigrants faced in the United States.24 Lesser’s work also focuses on
the Brazilian xenophobic reactions against these “undesirable” immigrants. Christina
Cirantos researches and analyzes the xenophobic reactions to the Syrian immigrants in
Argentina.25 Andrew Arsan reconstructed the first comprehensive transnational history
of Eastern Mediterranean migrations ranging from Ottoman Syria, the United States,
Marseilles, Cote d ’Ivoire, Senegal, Mauritania, French Sudan, French Guinea, Cote
d'Ivoire, Upper Volta, Dahomey, and Niger. Arsan argues that racial xenophobia from
the French colonial settlers, rather than the locals, shaped the ways the Lebanese
migrants represented themselves and justified their place in the French Empire.26
Other historians who depict the xenophobic reactions to the Syrian immigrants
specialize in the diasporic histories of other immigrants which overlap with Syrian
immigrants. Daniel Elazar and Peter Medding focus on the xenophobic reaction to
Sephardic Jews in Israel and along the Jewish diaspora, which are mostly Syrian Jews.
Lara Putnam, a Caribbean diasporic specialist, explores the xenophobic reactions to
the Syrian shop keepers in Jamaica and Trinidad during the Jazz Age. Putnam shows
that the exclusion acts of the 1920s targeted British West Indians, who returned to

first half of th e tw entieth century to restrict Syrian migration. Syrians w ere view ed by the United
States governm ent as Asian.
24 See Sarah Gualtieri, B etw een A rab and W hite: Race an d Ethnicity in the Early Syrian-Am erican
D iaspora (Berkeley: California University Press, 2009); John Tehranian, W hitew ashed: Am erica's
Invisible M id d le Eastern M in o rity (New York: New York University Press, 2008).
25 For more information about xenophobic reactions to the Syrian immigrants se e Christina Cirantos,
Betw een Argentines and Arabs: A rgentine Orientalism , A rab Im m igrants and the W riting o f Id e n tity

(Albany: University of New York Press, 2006); Daniel J. Elazar and Peter Medding, Jewish Com m unities
in Fro ntier Societies: Argentina, Australia, and South Africa (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983).

26 Andrew Arsan, Interlopers o f Empire: The Lebanese Diaspora in Colonial French W est Africa (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014).
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their homelands to limited economic opportunities. Jamaicans, in turn, pushed their
governments to pass exclusion acts against Syrians and Chinese emigrants, who
“stole” Jamaican jobs. A famous example of Jamaican anti-Syrian sentiment was in an
article by Marcus Garvey in the Kingston Daily Gleaner on Dec. 12, 1927, describing
the Syrians and Chinamen as “[sapping] the wealth of this country [Jamaica] while
[Jamaicans] die in poverty.”27 Although these historians focusing on other diasporic
peoples, they unintentionally exemplify how diasporic peoples share similar
experiences in sites of the diaspora. This historians also show how immigrants interact
with one another, sometimes not in the best ways. The Syrians throughout the diaspora
claimed the intermediary position between white and black races, and industrial and
rural regions. Their intermediary positioning in these categories, and their economic
success created racial xenophobia in their adopted homelands.
It is important to understand these interactions and how the different
immigrants had similar experiences in their diasporic sites and influenced each other
in these different communities. Without interaction with the Irish immigrants, the
Syrian diasporic experience and imagined community created may have taken a
different shape. The Syrian migrant interaction with the Irish migrants was not
primarily violent. The Syrians sold goods to the Irish migrants, married Irish migrants,
and communicated on a daily basis. The Syrians borrowed nation-building
methodologies from their Irish neighbors.

27 Article in Kingston Daily Gleaner, D ecem ber 1 2 ,1 9 2 7 , rpt. in Lara Putnam, Radical M oves: Caribbean
M ig ran ts and the Politics o f Race in the Jazz A ge (Raleigh: The University of North Carolina Press,
2007), 263
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Nationalistic protests and riots were very present among the Irish American
community even before the first wave of Syrian immigration, as seen by the 1868
riots. Irish immigrants were also a fragmented community, by regionalism and,
consequently, sectarianism, but presented a united front when discrimination against
them began after 183 0.28 Campbell theorizes that the lived experience o f the Irish in
their diasporic sites “and the newcomer’s status as a minority” forged a united national
identity and destroyed regionalism and sectarianism in the community.29 The Syrians
did not only interact with Irish migrants, but the “new migrants” as well. Syrian
migrants were living amongst Greek, Balkan, Italian, and Turkish migrants. This
exposed the Syrian migrants to constant interaction with national protests from these
new migrants and their methods of diasporic nation building. The Syrians seemed to
learn more from the Balkan and Greek migrants, with whom they also interacted due
to their commonality of Ottoman hegemony. Like the Balkan and Greek literature,
Syrian literature also depicted the Ottoman sultanate as oppressive, in attempts to
construct a separate Syrian nation. They also faced the same xenophobia, often being
clumped together as “dagos” in the diaspora because of their similar attributes.
The modernizing national fervor was widespread throughout the various
diasporic sites during the early half of the twentieth century, as Irish diasporic peoples
called for an Ireland for the Irish, free from British oppression, and the “Black
International” called for an “Africa for Africans”, embodied by Garvey and the Black

28 See Malcolm Campbell, Ireland's N e w Worlds: Im m igrants, Politics, and Society in the United States
and Australia, 1 8 1 5 -1 9 2 2 (Madison: University o f Wisconsin Press, 2007).
29 Ibid, 20
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Star Ship Line.30 The Jewish diaspora called for a Jewish homeland in reaction to the
anti-Semitism in Europe, which eventually took shape in the Belfour Declaration in
1917 to create that Jewish homeland in Palestine.31 It was common among diasporic
people during this era to view themselves as ‘liberators’ while they attempted to free
their ancestral homelands from the grips of colonialism and enlighten current
inhabitants. Immigrant diasporic peoples all used newspapers and literature to help
foster their imagined community and move these nationalistic ideals forward.32
Scholars such as Benedict Anderson have questioned the construction of
nationalism in diasporic communities, due to its complexity with emigration patterns.
Anderson coins the word “long-distance nationalism” to describe nationalism
phenomena in diasporic communities. However, Anderson questions the diasporic
participation in national politics. He does not believe that the diasporic migrants are
\

true exiles awaiting for victories in the homeland. Instead, Anderson believes that their

30 For more information about Garveyism and the African Diaspora in the early 20th century se e Adam
Ewing, Age o f Garvey: H o w a Jam aican Activist C reated a M ass M o v e m e n t and Changed G lobal Black
Politics( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Robert Trent, The Am ericans Are Com ing! Dream s
o f African Am erican Liberation in Segregationist South Africa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012);
Putnam, Radical M oves; Michael 0 . W est, William G. Martin, and Fanon Che Wilkins, From Toussaint
to Tupac: The Black In te rn a tio n a l Since the A ge o f Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2009); and James Campbell, Songs o f Zion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
31 For more about the Jewish Diaspora in the age of Nationalism se e Rebecca Kobra, Jewish Bialystok
an d Its Diaspora: The M o d e rn Jewish Experience (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010); Robert
Levine, Tropical Diaspora: The Jewish Experience in Cuba (Tampa: University of Florida Press, 1993);
Daniel J Elazar, and Peter Medding, Jewish Comm unities in F rontier Societies: A rgentina, Australia, and
South Africa (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983); Victor A. Mirelman, Jewish Buenos Aires 1 8 9 0 -1 9 3 0 :
In Search o f an Id e n tity (Detroit: W ayne State University Press, 1990); Jeffrey Lesser, W elcom ing the
Undesirables (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
32 Although many o f th e diasporas overlap and influenced one another during this tim e, this thesis will
focus primarily on the Syrian diasporic comm unity Little Syria. It is important to be well aware that the
sam e th em es (maybe not specifically sectarianism, but fragm entation and national unity) occur in
other diasporas at th e sam e time, but analysis of th e influences the diasporas had on one another in a
diasporic site will have to be saved for a later project. This thesis is focused on the sectarian
fragm entation and national unity in th e Syrian mahjar of Little Syria, New York during this era of
nationalism.
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voluntary emigration is proof of their detachment from the nation. He contends that
although they may support their homeland’s political causes, long distance ethnonationalists feel little attachment to homeland, paying no price for the long-distance
politics. Anderson suggests that nationalist immigrants are “emigres who have no
serious intention of going back home, which, as more time passes, more and more
serves as a phantom bedrock for an embattled metropolitan ethnic identity.”33 The
host-land becomes home for the migrants and long-distance nationalism is symbolic of
a frozen imagined past.
Anderson may have been influenced by earlier diasporic historiography when
writing about the symbolic nature of long-distance nationalism. Oscar Handlin’s The
Uprooted: The Epic Story o f the Great Migrations that made the American People
(1951) is considered the pioneering work of diasporic history. Handlin argues that
migration was experienced as an alienation from family, community, and tradition.
Handlin suggests that immigrants are uprooted from their culture and assimilated into
their host countries, creating a melting pot. Many diasporic historians between the
1950s and the 1980s, including Alixa Naff, Charlotte Erickson and Rowland Berthoff,
followed Handlin’s path by focusing on the assimilation of diasporic groups.
Scholarship of the 1980s moved away from the melting pot theory of diasporic
identities. In The Transplanted: A History o f Immigrants in Urban America (1987),
John Bodnar refutes the notion that immigrants were uprooted from cultures of their
homeland. Instead, Bodnar suggests that immigrants transplanted the cultural and

33 Benedict Anderson, "Long Distance Nationalism: World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics"
(paper presented at th e W ertheim Lecture, CASA, University of Amsterdam, 1992), 12.
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political values of their homelands in host-societies. Since Bodnar’s ground-breaking
work, historiography of the diaspora has analyzed conditions which prevented
assimilation and allowed for long-distance nationalism to spread throughout
immigrant communities. Khater argues that the returning migrants and the diasporic
newspapers forged a middle class, constructed gender-roles, and modernized culture in
the Lebanese region, as defined by middle-class America.34 I argue that Syrian
migrants did not necessarily transplant the cultural and political values of their
homelands, but reconstructed them in the form of sectarianism through print
capitalism due to their experience in the mahjar.
Contrary to Anderson’s theory, the Syrian newspaper editors and their readers
maintained feelings of attachment to the homeland in the diasporic communities. The
editors paid the price for their visions of the emerging Syrian nation through lobbying
efforts. The diasporic newspapers constructed a collective national identity to give
voice to the community against the injustices they experienced in the mahjar and
protect themselves from foreign threat. Hani Bawardi refutes Anderson’s theory when
he analyzes the Syrian political organizations the migrants constructed and their calls
for a separate Syrian nation. The immigrants were very involved in the political
atmosphere in Syria, forming organizations to push for Syrian independence. The
nationalist fervor was apparent in the mahjar, which shows the triumph of a Syrian

34 Akram Fouad Khater, Inventing Hom e: Em igration, Gender, and the M id d le Class in Lebanon, 1 8 7 0 1 9 2 0 (Berkley: University of California Press, 2001), 90

21

national identity to unite the colonies.35 Not only were the migrants involved in Syrian
politics, but they also were involved in the modernization project of the Syrian nation.
Bawardi urges his audience not to exaggerate the presence of sectarianism
among the immigrants because the political organizations showed a union of Syrians
of all sects with a nationalist goal. However the Syrian migrants who subscribed to
these newspapers based on their sectarian affiliation, and the literary elites who called
upon the masses to put aside sectarian strife in favor o f a united front would disagree. I
contribute to this historiography by proving that sectarianism still persisted in the
mahjar, reproducing itself in print-capitalism as the elite fought one another for
influence. I will also show that the Syrian migrants did not only unite under a national
identity in political organizations but also against domestic threats. Sectarianism was
very much alive among the common immigrants, but the factions briefly united when
presented with a foreign threat against the Syrian community.
To make this project feasible, this analysis concentrates on the events of Little
Syria during this time. The community newspapers highlight the fragmentations o f the
community. These sources show how the calls for national unity in the diaspora to
/

confront foreign influence in Syria. The newspapers will also show the provocations
from other immigrants in Manhattan, which caused unity within the Syrian
neighborhood to defend themselves as Syrians. The first section of this thesis covers a
brief history of the sectarian tensions in the Ottoman Empire which led to the creation
of an immigrant colony in New York, while also highlighting the divisions between

35 See Hani Bawardi, The M ak in g o f A rab Am ericans: From Syrian N atio n alism to U.S. Citizenship.
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2014).
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the immigrants in the mahjar. The original confrontations that the immigrants faced in
their experience with the New York Police Department and the Irish-American
immigrant communities in Manhattan to cause them to unite and forge a collective
community, finalized by creating the first newspaper of the diaspora. The second
section will cover 1900-1905, with the street riot being the apex of sectarian disputes.
More newspapers were created during the first decade of the twentieth century, further
fragmenting the community along sectarian lines.
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Ottoman Syria: Industrial Transformations
The Ottoman Millet System and Religious Tolerance
Sectarian tensions have plagued Syria since the medieval era as sectarian
groups splintered from Christian and Muslim groups and were persecuted as heretics.
Wars erupted over which religious sect should have more political representation.
During the Fourth Crusade, Roman Catholics laid siege to the Greek Orthodox
Antioch Church in Constantinople, causing fights between the Maronites and the
Greek Orthodox peoples in Syria. Yet, the first wave of mass emigration from the
Syrian did not occur until after I860.36
The Ottoman Empire was vastly diverse in its ethnic and religious
composition; Ottoman Christian and Jews were protected under Islamic law as dhimmi
communities. The poly-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman subjects worked and
worshipped side by side. Persecution based upon religious convictions were very rare,
but tolerance of religion did not necessarily cause an egalitarian society. The dhimmi
people were treated as second-class citizens in Ottoman society, in order to recognize
the primacy of Islam. To successfully accommodate their diverse religious subjects
and maintain their loyalty, the Ottomans gave dhimmi communities sufficient

36 The brief history of th e sects begin with the Council of Chalcedon, which led the Syriac Orthodox
from th e Chalcedonians in 451 and violence b etw een th e tw o sects. The Syrian Orthodox accepted a
non-Chalcedonian, Severus, as Patriarch and relied more on Constantinople under the Byzantine rite.
The Greek Orthodox Church seced ed from the Holy Roman Catholic Church in 1054. In 1724 Cyril VI
was elected the Greek Patriarch of Antioch, and he led th e split from th e Greek Orthodox Church of
Antioch, as th e Melkite Greek Catholic Church, w elcom ed back into the com m union of the Roman
Catholic Church. The Maronite Catholics is a different rite from th e Roman Catholic Church, w ho took
their nam e from their first church, Reesh Moran (head of our lord). For more information about the
history of late antiquity sectarian conflicts am ong Christians se e Menz Volker-Lorenz, Justinian a n d the
m aking o f the Syrian O rthodox Church (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). During the fourth
crusade Catholics sacked Greek Orthodox tow ns in 1203. For more information about the fourth
crusade se e John Julius Norwich, Byzantium : The Decline and Fall (London: Folio Society, 2003).
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opportunities to become economic stakeholders in the empire. Although they were
restricted in status, the dhimmi became the backbone of the Ottoman financial and
diplomatic administration. For instance, wealthy Phanariote Greek Orthodox Christian
families controlled the revenue produced by Moldavia and Wallachia, shaped Ottoman
foreign policy, and administered the Aegean islands.
The millet system was implemented by the Ottoman Empire to keep their
religious minorities loyal to the sultanate by granting their religious communities “a
degree of legal autonomy and authority with the acquiescence of the Ottoman state.”37
The patriarch of each millet community was responsible for the community’s taxes in
exchange for state recognition of autonomy. However, the millet system was unevenly
enforced throughout the Ottoman Empire, supporting only larger minority religious
communities. Smaller religious communities, like Jews, Maronite Catholics, and
Armenian Christians, did not have sufficient ecclesiastical centers to meet their needs
and traditions. Smaller religious communities resented the Greek Orthodox Christians
for their special privileges and prosperity under the Ottoman millet system. The
Maronites were one of the groups who resented the Greek Orthodox. Their resentment
strengthened over the years, transpiring in the Syrian diaspora in the nineteenth
century. Animosity between the two sects was witnessed in Little Syria as members of
the Maronite elite attacked a Greek Orthodox bishop, causing a riot in the Manhattan
neighborhood.

37 Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, Christians an d Jews in the O tto m an Empire: The Functioning o f
a Plural Society (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1982), 12-13.
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The Maronite resentment of the Greek Orthodox was due to their minority
status in the Ottoman Empire. The Maronite Church in the Mount Lebanon region
were forced to seek investiture from the pope rather than the Sultan, because the
Ottomans were not interested in this small religious community. Due to the weakness
and disorganization of the Maronite church, their political affiliations to the muqati j i ,
or the fief holder/chief, and amir in the Mount Lebanon region cut across sectarian
lines.38 The community of Druze, Maronites, Nusayri-Alawites, Nizari-Ismailis, and
Shiites shared the same political affiliation of the chief of the region, which was
usually a Sunni Muslim. Notable families in Mount Lebanon dominated to role of the
chief of the region, like the Shihabi, Khazin, M a’ni and Jumblatt families. The Shihabi
family ruled during the second half of the eighteenth century and united the different
religious communities in Mount Lebanon for almost a century.39 These communities
were religiously fluid, the Shihabi family was predominantly Sunni. However, some
branches of the Shihabi family converted to the Maronite faith or the Druze faith.
Sectarian lines hardened throughout the nineteenth century during Ottoman economic
downturns and political transitions. The Maronite Church was also restructured with
Papal financing and strengthened during this period. As it strengthened, the Maronite
clergy sought political dominance in Mount Lebanon.
The relative autonomy and freedoms dhimmi societies received under
Ottoman rule were not constant. In times of turmoil and economic downturn,

38 The muqati'ji also collected taxes from their diverse community
39 See Iliya F. Hakik, Politics an d Change in a Tradition al Society, 1 7 1 1 -1 8 4 5 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1968). The union am ong the sects under Shihabi rule fell in 1841 w hen Amir Bashir
Mulhim Shihab (Bashir III) alienated his Druze subjects by allying with Muhammad Ali Pasha of Egypt,
when Egypt occupied the region.
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prosperous dhimmi subjects were attacked with stricter restrictions. It was common
for the Ottoman administrations to increase the jizaya head tax when there was an
economic downturn, but they increased all taxes for all the peasants at the same time.40
Sometimes old restrictions were resurrected due to the belief that Ottoman laxity and
moral corruption led to the economic downturn of the Empire. Sometimes nonMuslims were tricked into converting due to jealousy of economic success during
these economic downturns 41 Economic downturns followed the wars of the eighteenth
century, when the Ottoman Empire realized the limits of its expansionist rule and
began losing territories in the Balkans and Crimea. The Ottoman Empire had to
modernize its military, economy, and political sectors in face of these defeats. The
cavalry was replaced with an expanded janissary, which now included Ottoman
Muslim peasants. Extraordinary taxes, or avariz, was made regular to fund wars, and
tax-farming replaced the old feudal system. Tax-farming allowed for the emergence of
the notable families in Syria and the decentralization of the Ottoman Empire, blurring
the lines between the peasantry and the nobility.

Industrialization and Foreign Influence
Old restrictions and religious tensions resurfaced in the nineteenth century as
the Ottoman economy was transformed by the spread of capitalism and
industrialization. International trade increased sixty-five fold. Industrialized Western
countries aggressively penetrated the Ottoman economy, transforming transportation

40 The jizaya head tax was taxes reserved for dhimmi protection in lieu of conscription into the
Ottoman Army.
41 For more about forced conversions se e Tijana Kristie, Contested Conversions to Islam: N arratives o f
Religious Change in the Early M o d e rn O tto m a n Em pire (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).
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and Ottoman politics. In 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Egypt and Syria to
dominate Eastern trade. Bonaparte also hoped attack British commerce by
undermining British access to India. The Ottomans reconquered Egypt with the help of
the British. In exchange, the British received capitulations which allowed the British
to flood Ottoman markets with British exports. Domestic commodities such as
Mediterranean sugar, mocha coffee, and Indian dye were replaced by cheaper
European colonial commodities. European colonial products were made cheaper
through slave labor and advanced mechanization, yielding greater production. By
1840 British cotton replaced Indian cotton due to the labor saving mechanisms o f the
spinning jenny, water frame, and the Samuel Crompton’s mule.42 These inventions
allowed for good quality yam at competitive prices. Western countries financed
railroads and steamships in the Ottoman Empire to increase the availability of their
commodities in Ottoman markets. Traditional commercial centers were displaced by
deep-water port cities, like Beirut. The improvement of transportation and
communications in the Ottoman Empire led to population growth. European financiers
began opening silk factories in Syria in response for the increasing French demand for
silk thread. Growing number of women and children were incorporated into the
manufacturing work force while traditional guilds decreased in strength. The shift to
unskilled and unorganized labor financed by Western Europeans depressed wages and

42 Halil Inalcik, "When and how British cotton goods invaded th e Levant Markets," in The O tto m a n
Em pire and the W orld-Econom y, ed. Huri Islamoglu- Inan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1987), 377.
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increased inflation. The transition of a ‘modernized’ Levant commenced, as gender
roles and family structures were reconfigured in face of industrialization.43
In the 1830s Muhammad Ali Pasha declared Egypt independent from the
Ottoman Empire and invaded Syria. To protect their Ottoman and Indian markets,
France, Britain, and Russia assisted the Ottomans in reconquering Syrian territory. To
further punish Muhammad Ali Pasha, Sultan Mahmut II held a trade convention with
Great Britain in 1838. Under the Anglo-Turkish Convention, Sultan Mahmut II
granted the British equal economic rights to other foreign nations. The capitulations
agreed upon were made permanent, allowing the British to buy Ottoman products and
resell with limited duty-cost. European merchants extended their advantageous
capitulations to Ottoman Christians through berat certifications. Berat certifications
gave Christians tax exemptions. Although the Anglo-Turk Convention was meant to
hurt Muhammad Ali Pasha, it displaced Muslim merchants and Ottoman industrial
workers.
The Ottoman economy plummeted after the Crimean War, allowing greater
European intervention. To fund the Crimean War in 1853, the Ottoman Sultanate
obtained high-interest European loans to strengthen and modernize their military
technology. The frantic effort by the Ottomans to modernize their military was not
enough to stop Russia from defeating them. When the Ottomans lost the Crimean War,
their economy plummeted and they defaulted on their loans. Defaulting on the loans
allowed foreign lenders to directly penetrate the Ottoman economy to o protect their

43 For more about the modernization of Lebanon and th e formation of gender and the middle class,
se e Akram Khater, Inventing Hom e: Em igration, Gender, and the M id d le Class in Lebanon, 1 8 7 0 -1 9 2 0
(Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 2001)
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foreign investments. European powers directly collected taxes on certain commodities
like tobacco and silk. Modem European financial institutions were constructed to
collect taxes for European lenders. The European collection of Ottoman taxes
continued until the nation-state of Turkey finally repaid the European lenders in 1923.
In the meantime, European control of taxation and its ability to recover loans
encouraged further foreign investment in the Ottoman Empire.
In Mount Lebanon, foreign capital took its shape in the growing silk industry.
For centuries, sericulture, or the raising of silkworms, had been a component to the
Mountain’s economy, along with olives, wheat, and grapes. The mountains became
the site of economic opportunities by 1711. Silk made in the mountains were
demanded inland to sell to the European merchants. This left less land for peasants to
farm crops and wheat, so they relied on grain from inland Syria and Egypt.44 This
delicate economic balance crashed in 1838 after the Anglo-Turkish Convention.
Sultan Mahmud of Ottoman Empire made treaties with Great Britain, France, Russia
and Austria to abolish local monopolies and protectionist trade for European
merchants, in order to hurt the Egyptian economy.45 This made European goods
cheaper than the goods produced in Syria, which hurt the Syrian agricultural sector,
but allowed the silk sector to prosper. The inhabitants of Mount Lebanon came to rely
on the European market for livelihood. The Lebanese economy transformed into an
export-economy, existing on the whim of the demand for silk. To curb European

44 Engin Akarli, The Long Peace: O tto m a n Lebanon, 1 8 6 1 -1 9 2 0 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1993), 20.
45 Mohamed Ali Pasha w as the ruler of Egypt at this tim e and was th e sultan's bitter adversary. He had
econom ic connections with France and Great Britain, but offering th e sam e treaties would cause his
econom ic policy to collapse. He relaxed his tariffs to appease th ese powers.
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influence and modernize the Ottoman Empire, Sultan A bdulm e^d passed the Edict of
Giilhane in 1839, which abolished tax farming, imposed universal military
conscription and secularize law to eliminate the millet system. The edict also allowed
for the reform of Ottoman educational, financial, and bureaucratic infrastructures. In
1856, the Ottoman government passed the Hatt-i Humayun or the Imperial Reform
Edict to promise freedom of religion. These reforms abolished the millet system and
gave Ottoman Christians greater rights, allowing them to become civil servants and
rise politically. Ussamma Makdisi argues that these edicts led to competition between
the Ottoman Empire and foreign powers over the loyalty of the sects in the Syrian
province, allowing the sects greater political power.46 Increased power for the
sectarian groups allowed for intrasectarian competition to attempt to monopolize their
political power over the other sects, a trend which migrants eventually took with them
throughout the diaspora.
Foreign intervention and inflation caused by the capitulations and reform
edicts led to sectarian tensions against the Ottoman Christian benefactors. Maronite
peasants in Mount Lebanon were able to prosper and buy honorary titles. Maronite
peasants vied for greater political power. Khater suggests that the emergence of the
silk-export economy led to the making of the middle class in Lebanon.47 Sectarian
strife in the Mount Lebanon region was inter-sectarian until these political aspirations
pitted Maronites against their Druze neighbors in Mount Lebanon, eventually leading
to mass migrations. Sectarian tensions between the Druze and the Maronites brewed

46 Ussama Makdisi, "Corrupting th e Sublime Sultanate: The Revolt of Tanyus Shahin in N ineteenthCentury Ottoman Lebanon" Com parative Studies in Society and History 42 (2000).
47 Khater, 21
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for about forty years prior to the 1860 massacres. Both the Druze and Maronites vied
for political dominance in the Lebanese mountains and disputed over land and harsh
tax-farming tenancy regulations.48 The Druze were considered Muslim brethren of
sorts, because the Druze sect was a sect of Twelver Shi’a Islam. This sect was
tolerated by the Ottoman Empire, which promoted Muslim interests above those of
their dhimmi subjects. Druze inhabitants did not have to pay the jizaya tax and were
treated preferentially due to their Islamic beliefs. When additional taxes were imposed
by Abdullah Pasha, the Akka governor, in the 1820s, skirmishes erupted along the
mountains. The Maronites felt that the tax distribution was unequal. Druze landlords
appeared to be favored over Maronite tenants. Maronites believed that they suffered
from overburdening taxation and resented the preferential treatment towards their
Druze landlords, and they imported this mentality to the. However, Ottoman
preferential treatment towards Druze did not prevent Maronites from becoming
successful, nor did it prevent peaceful neighborly relations with the Druze prior to the
nineteenth century. The class struggle assumed a sectarian coloring as European
governments became more involved in Mount Lebanon’s economy. Maronites
remembered their treatment and unfair taxation as proof of Ottoman oppression. The
collective memory of Ottoman oppression and European salvation remained with
Maronites even years after migrants settled in other countries. In Little Syria,
Maronites justified their migration by blaming Ottoman oppression, as they did
throughout Europe.

48 For more about early relations b etw een the Druze and the M aronites se e Iliya F. Hakik, Politics and
Change in a Traditional Society, 1 7 1 1 -1 8 4 5 . (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).
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The combination of harsh Ottoman and Druze taxation to fund the reform
projects and resentment of privileges caused sectarian solidarities and clashes in the
mountains. The Europeans were seen as allies with the Christians due to European
extension of berat certificates to Christian merchants; thus Muslim merchants
bankrupted by European commercialization were resentful of the Christian Syrians.
After the French invaded the Mount Lebanon silk economy, the French Consulate
influenced regional politics. The French Consulate would only consult with Maronites,
so the Maronite Church was able to gain a central role in the politics of Mount
Lebanon. The Church’s new political role created a new sphere of political life beyond
the Amir and chiefs. The Druze resented French intervention in regional politics. In
reaction, many Druze landlords in the mountains imposed harsh conditions for their
Maronite tax-farmers. The Maronite Church and French Consulate became more
active in defending its constituents. Meanwhile, Druze kinsmen rallied together to
defend themselves, financed by the British Consulate. The tension in the region
escalated to civil war in 1860. The 1860 massacres were the most brutal sectarian
confrontations in the mountains to date, embedded in the minds of the immigrants who
sought emigration to escape these violent confrontations. Inhabitants of Little Syria
retold the horrors of the 1860 Massacres to justify their emigration from the
oppressive Ottoman Empire.
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Sectarian Tensions Erupt: The 1860 Massacres
The most immediate cause of the 1860 massacres was a dispute between a
Druze boy and a Maronite boy in Beit Miri in August 29th, 1859.49 The parents o f the
children disputed over parenting skills and respect. Feeling threatened, the Maronite
inhabitants of Bayt Miri recruited Maronite kinsmen from neighboring villages. They
took up arms against their Druze neighbors the following day. On August 30th 1859,
the skirmish more Druze than Maronites were killed. That winter, the Druze planned
their revenge. Using British funding, the Druze chiefs secured arms through Khurshid
Pasha of Beirut and rose in April of 1860. The massacres spread throughout the Syrian
province and lasted until July 1860.
These massacres erupted along the coast of Greater Syria: from Kisrawan to
Damascus, leaving 360 villages and 560 churches burnt to ashes. While many lost
their homes, Syrians realized the necessity of emigration to escape this oppression and
violence. British Consul of Damascus, Colonel Charles H. Churchill, lived in
Bahwwarah at the time. As an eyewitness to the massacres in Syria, Churchill
described brutal scenes from the massacres in his diary:
"The Druzes rushed upon them sw ord in hand, and cut down every man they m et. The
wom en and children fle d in dire consternation. With a wild cry o f despair the whole
population hurried down the nearest ravine,' leaving their village behind them already in

49 The dispute b etw een the children is questionable. Missionary Henry Jessup details it in his mem oirs,
claiming that the dispute was over a chicken. See Henry Jessup, Fifty-Three Years in Syria (New York:
Fleming H. Revell Co, 1910), 170. Philip Hitti believed it to be a com m on "brawl" which can be
presum ed as a wrestling match; See Philip Hitti, Lebanon in History (London: Macmillan & Co Ltd,
1962), 437. However, Beiruti children in the 1970s w ere taught it erupted after a dispute b etw een
children over a gam e of marbles. Samar Sakr, in discussion with th e author, October 2014.
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flam es. Twelve hundred men w ere m assacred over the space o f tw o miles, so rapid had been
the pursuit. Many took shelter in caves and holes in rocks, where they rem ained fo r days in a
sta te o f starvation... upwards o f 300 bodies strew ed and the sea-beach and the gardens
round about. The shrieks o f the wom en and children rent the air."so

This scene occurred in May of 1860 along the route to Sidon, as Christians fled
their villages to save themselves from Druze rage. Meanwhile, Druze soldiers laid
siege to Deir al Qammar for twenty-two days, against the Maronites who had fled their
homes. Maronite homes were torched and turned to ashes. Unsuspecting Maronites
were ambushed by the Druze soldiers and tom apart, limb-by-limb. Maronites fled for
their lives and sought refuge in the Deir al Qamar, the site of an important Maronite
Church, Saidat al Talle (Lady of the H ill).51 The city had barracks to protect the
Maronites, but the Druze broke through the barracks and laid siege to the city. Two
thousand Christians were massacred, as the Dmze burned down the city. In total, the
highest estimate of Christians that were killed during the 1860 massacre in Greater
Syria reached 20,000.52
The sectarian war o f 1860 did not escalate into a religious war, but it did affect
other sects beyond the Dmze and the Maronites. Although only the Maronites were in
conflict with their Dmze neighbors, Maronites were not the only Christians targeted in
1860; the Greek Orthodox community in Wadi al-Taim did not escape the rage of the

50 Charles H. Churchill, The Druzes and the M aro n ites : U n der the Turkish Rule fro m 1 8 4 0 to 1 8 6 0
(London: Bernard Quaritch, 1862), 156-157. Colonel Churchill w as an eye w itness to this event; he
spent the past tw enty years living in Bahawwarah, Syria as a British consul.
51 Located in South W est Modern Day Lebanon. Translation of the city's name is M onastery of the
M oon. The city has a long religious and political history,
“ Philip and Joseph Kayal, The Syrian Lebanese in A m erica: A Study in Religion and Assim ilation
(Boston: Twayne, 1975).
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Dmze Syrians. On the other hand, few Sunni and Shi’a Muslims joined the Dmze. The
Maronites saw this incident as Ottoman persecution because the Ottoman soldiers did
nothing to stop the Dmze militia. In fact, some Ottoman soldiers lured Maronites into
an ambush, by offering Christians asylum in order to disarm them.53 Khurshid Pasha
was blamed for supplying the Dmze with arms, and the Turkish irregular cavalry was
reported by Churchill to have “joined vigorously in the pursuit” of the Christians and
raping Christian women.54
Maronite migrants throughout the Diaspora retold the horrific events of the
Massacre as proof of Ottoman persecution against them. Although they had not lived
it, memories of the Massacre passed from parents and neighbors to the migrants, who
retold the tale of loss and persecution in the Diaspora. In fact, the Ottoman consul in
Barcelona in 1889, Yusuf Bey, reported his embarrassment of the Lebanese Maronite
migrants who dressed in rags telling stories of Ottomans massacring their wives and
children.55 Arsan argues that Syrian migrants were not above manipulating their
position as Eastern Christians “to play upon the piety and pity” of natives in their
adopted homelands.56 However, Syrian migrants who retold the stories of the
massacres did believe that they were oppressed by the Ottoman Sultanate. Syrian
migrants reported the history of Syrian Christian persecution to New York

53 Gregory Orfalea, The A rab Am ericans: A History (Northampton: Olive Branch Press, 2006), 58
54 Churchill, 145.
55 Engin Arkali, "Ottoman Attitudes towards Lebanese emigration, 1885-1910" in Arsan, Interlopers ,
29.
56 Arsan, 29.
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newspapers, to give reasons why they migrated and why Syria should become a
separate nation-state from the oppressive Turkish Empire.57
Although Syrian Christians felt as though the Ottomans did nothing to stop
their persecution, the actions of the Druze and the Ottoman soldiers who aided them
did not go unpunished. The French Consulate, British Consulate, Russian Consulate
and the Maronite, Greek Orthodox, and Druze authorities clamored against their
injustices. To pacify them, Ottoman Foreign Minister Fouad Pasha blamed Ottoman
officers for failing to prevent the attacks and punished them severely. Furthermore,
forty-eight Druze leaders were condemned to death, twenty-four imprisoned and 249
exiled.58 Some of these punishments were not executed because sentenced Druze
chieftains fled the mountain. Many Druze migrated south to Houran, Syria. The
Maronite Church was left as the most powerful institution in Mount Lebanon. To
monopolize its influence, the Maronite Church built schools, hospitals, and
monopolized the land to render services to the inhabitants.
The Ottomans joined Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia in
creating a special Ottoman govemorate, mutasarifiyya, in Mount Lebanon under the
leadership of a Maronite governor. The mutasarifiyya officially ended the previous
rule of a local Amir and created a confessional government in Mount Lebanon. The
Reglement required that the Administrative Council and the judicial system of Mount
Lebanon have councilors and justices to represent each sect in Mount Lebanon,
elected by the majority leader of each province. Maronites made up the majority of

57 '"Young Syria Holds a Meeting: An Open Air Demonstration to Aid Their Cause for Freedom" The
N e w York Daily Tribune, August 1 1 ,1 8 9 9 .
58 Hitti, Lebanon, 440
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most of the Lebanese provinces. Thus, sectarian leaders amiable to the Maronite
Church were elected. While the Maronite Church increased in political dominance,
more Druze inhabitants of Mount Lebanon migrated to Houran. Houran was renamed
Jabal al- Druze, or the Druze mountains to accommodate for the growing population
of migrants. Many of the Druze landowners in Shuf were forced to sell their lands to
Maronites during Franko Pasha’s governorship of the mutasarifiyya.59 The Druze’s
influence in the mountain had been forcibly replaced by the Maronite Church and the
French consulate. The Druze who could become elected to administrative had to be
amicable to the Church, thereby increasing Church influence. After Franko’s
governorship of the Mountain in 1873, governors tried to weaken the Maronite Church
without success. The Sublime Porte feared another civil war in the Syrian province
because they did not want further European aggression into Syrian economy and
politics.
While Ottoman governors were appointed to check the power of the Council,
the Porte checked the power of the governors. As the governors pushed reforms to
weaken the domination of the Maronite Church, the Porte prevented the governors
from interfering in Lebanese politics, for fear of further foreign aggression. For the
next fifty years, the Porte maintained a policy of peace in Mount Lebanon using its
personal treasury. The Administrative Council vetoed every measure o f increasing
taxation and invoked Porte to repay tax deficits. The Porte’s peace policy allowed an
autonomous Lebanese government to develop.

59 Akarli, Long Peace, 53. Franko Pasha was renowned for his alliance with the M aronite Church.
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The 1860 Massacre was the immediate cause of a new Ottoman govemorate.
The restoration of stability and peace in the wake of the Massacre gave European
capitalists greater access to the Levantine markets, in a time where the demand of silk
increased due to the decrease of American cotton during the American Civil War. The
massacres also provoked Syrian migration to other parts of the Ottoman Empire. With
the horrors of the massacres fresh on their minds, Syrian Christians boarded boats to
escape the sectarian conflict and created the first mahjar site in Egypt. Egypt had
economic ties to Greater Syria since the eighteenth century. After the construction of
the Suez Canal, Egypt promised economic opportunities for migrants. Sectarian
tension increased as politics began to depend on sectarian representation in the
mutasarifiyya, so Druze and Greek Orthodox inhabitants decided to migrate to escape.
There were other causes in the nineteenth century that paved the way for
Syrian emigration, such as the decline in economic opportunities in the Greater Syrian
area. When the Suez Canal opened in 1869, the silk market faced competition with
cheaper Far Eastern silk. Depression in silk prices affected Levantine markets, since
forty percent o f the M ountain’s population earned a living through the silk trade. The
transformations in the Ottoman financial infrastructure were mirrored in political and
0

legal infrastructure as the Sultanate sought reforms to industrialize and modernize.
The increase in reforms were aggravated by foreign powers who invested in their
Ottoman markets. Modernization created social displacement and discontent during
the transition of traditional infrastructures to modem ones. Families were displaced as
the family economies declined, reconstmcting social values and constructing a modem
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notion of gender.60 The uprooting of traditional structures encouraged Syrian peasants
to seek education and to progress in the industrialized world. Many decided to migrate
to European countries to seek a modem education.

60 For more information se e Judith E. Tucker, "Decline of th e Family Economy in M id-Nineteenth
Century Egypt" in The M o d e rn M id d le East, ed. Albert Hourani et al. (Berkeley, California: University of
California Press, 1993).
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America: The Land of Opportunity
The United States was not an initial destination for Syrian emigrants because
the American Civil War was underway at this time. Also, the United States was not
yet an economic world power. The American Civil War and the decrease of American
cotton in international markets created a greater demand for Lebanese silk in Europe,
actually strengthening the economy in Mount Lebanon. After the Massacre of 1860,
the Syrian silk industry soared as European powers forced their way into the economy
and politics. The mutasarifiyya created by the Reglement of 1861, allowed for greater
European interventions into the Mount Lebanon inexpensive labor market. Article X
of the Reglement stated that “all commercial litigation in the Mountain under the
jurisdiction of the Ottoman Commercial Tribunal in Beirut.”61 The tribunal was
constituted of European and Maronite merchants who held berat certificates
exempting them from duties.
Article X allowed for European monopolization of the Lebanese economy. The
direct degree of control European investors had made the region attractive for
European investments. European financiers invested in the improvement of Syrian
transportation technology. Connecting the mountains to the deep-water port cities
allowed for bigger, quicker, cheaper and more regular shipments of silk. The road
system increased three-fold between 1851 and 1912. European-financed steamboats
reduced freight costs by twenty-five percent. Europeans also financed Lebanese
‘owned’ silk factories in Lebanon to guarantee themselves yearly supplies of silk

61 John P. Spagnolo, France and O tto m a n Lebanon: 1 8 6 1 -1 9 1 4 (London: Ithaca Press, 1977), 42.
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thread and receive interest on their investments. By 1893 there were one hundred
forty-nine silk factories in Mount Lebanon. The citizens of Mount Lebanon prospered,
limiting migrations until the silk market collapsed in 1875. The prices for silk
remained depressed after the Suez Canal had finished construction. The Suez Canal
allowed for China and Japan to more feasibly join the world market and provide
competitive prices for silk. The market depression combined with the population
boom and lack of arable land in Syria encouraged Syrians to look towards the United
States for economic amelioration.
By 1880, the United States had established itself as a desirable destination for
quick riches for Syrian migrants who wished to ameliorate their financial situation as
fertile land became scarce and population boomed. The early wave of Syrian
migration prior to 1900 was a result of Syrian exposure to American missionaries and
the world fairs in Philadelphia (1876) and in Chicago (1893). In 1866, American
Presbyterian missionaries constructed the Syrian Protestant College, now known as
American University of Beirut. Syrian notables sent their children to foreign schools
to provide the best modem education, especially after their disillusionment with the
decline o f Ottoman education. The Presbyterian missionaries unintentionally
encouraged Syrians to immigrate to the United States by describing the country as
Christian-friendly. Given the collective memory of the 1860 massacres and sectarian
tension, a wealthy Christian-friendly nation appeared ideal. The missionaries shared
attractive American ideologies and showed photographs of the wealthy cities.62
Syrians in the American missionary schools were taught grammar, algebra, geometry,

62Randa Kayyali, The A rab Am ericans. (Westport: G reenwood Publishing Group, 2005), 28-29.
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American geography, and Western notions of liberalism through secular texts. The
missionaries also did humanitarian work and provided medical relief, which made the
Americans appear to be hospitable and charitable people.63 Missionary teachings and
tales of prosperity glorified the United States and prompted the earliest Syrian
migrants to venture to New York.
The Syrian traders who travelled to the United States for the Philadelphia
Centennial Exposition of 1876 also reported upon the display of American wealth. The
news from the traders reinforced the promise of American prosperity throughout
Syria, as silk prices depreciated. Many emigrated with the intention to make enough
money to return home richer, like the Italian and Polish immigrants at the same time.64
Syrian migrants were not economically, religiously, or politically displaced peasants,
but were looking for financial amelioration. Migrants sent nineteen million dollars in
remittances to their families in Syria in 1924.65 The news of these immigrants’
prosperity traveled back to Syria through kin and trade networks became more reliable
reports. The regularity of remittances created the image of the United States as the
land of opportunity and encouraged the first wave of Syrian immigration.
Najib Arbeely reminisced on the friendly interactions with the kind and
generous Presbyterian missionaries in the first Arabic newspaper printed in Little

63 Alixa Naff, Becoming Am erican and the Early A rab Im m ig ra n t Experience (Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1993), 35
64 For more about Polish migration patterns see Brian McCook, The Borders o f Integratio n: Polish
M ig ran ts in G erm any an d the U n ited States, 1 8 7 0 -1 9 2 4 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2011). For
more about the effects of return migration for th e modernization of Italy see Linda Reeder, W idows in
W hite: M ig ra tio n an d the Transform ation o f R ural Italia n W om en, Sicily, 1 8 8 0 -1 9 2 0 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2003).
65 Charles Issawi, An Economic History o f the M id d le East and N orth Africa (London: M etheun & Co.
Ltd, 1982), 86.
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Syria, Kawkab America. Arbeely describes the friendly interactions between Syrians
and American Protestant missionaries and the hospitality shown to the Americans in
Arbeen, Syria in the 1860s.66 Arbeely’s testimony to his American audience was an
attempt to ease American unease and xenophobia against the new Syrian migrants. He
created his newspaper, Kawkab America, to bridge the gap between Americans and
Syrian migrants, and teach his readers the parallels of both cultures. Arbeely’s article
is influenced by his personal experience with the missionaries sponsored by his
family. Arbeely believes that the missionaries had the same interactions with other
Syrian families in Arbeen, which impacted the migrant’s decisions to migrate to the
United States.
Arbeely’s father, Joseph Arbeely, was a professor who taught the American
Presbyterian missionaries Arabic.67 Joseph later described to the Public Ledger that he
was forced to give the missionaries their Arabic lessons in secret at night, because the
Ottoman government were hostile to missionaries.68 Joseph bought lands in his own
name to allow the Presbyterian missionaries to build their churches. Joseph was
disillusioned with the Ottoman Empire before the massacre because the authorities
were blocking all foreign mission efforts. This disillusionment transformed into the
decision to leave his homeland following the 1860 massacres, in which he survived by
hiding himself in a secret room.69 As he watched Druze inhabitants bum down the

66 Najib Arbeely, "Local News" K aw kab A m erica, April 1 5 ,1 8 9 2 . Translated by the author.
67 In som e articles his nam e is spelled as Yusuf, which is the Arabic translation of Joseph. Since he
seem ed to prefer th e American spelling in the rest of th e new spaper articles, I will stick with th e
Anglicized version of his name.
68 "Professor Arbeely: a Learned Christian Syrian and His Family Emigrate to Tennessee" Public Ledger,
October 3 0 ,1 8 8 3 .
69 Ibid.
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houses of his neighbors, Joseph Arbeely knew that he had to leave his village. Dressed
in Druze garb, he escaped to the English Consul, who helped his entire family relocate
to Beirut to teach at the Syrian Protestant College. Moving to Beirut was not enough
for Joseph Arbeely, who was determined to leave the “retrograde civilization and a
tyrannical government” o f the Ottoman Empire for good.70 Joseph Arbeely used his
American connections to secure a teaching position in the United States and migrate.
■->

The Arbeely family’s connection with the American Presbyterian missionaries
and their disillusionment with the Ottoman Empire prompted them to immigrate to the
United States in 1878. Joseph “desired freedom of speech and action and education for
[his] children.”71 The Arbeely residence in New York was short-lived. Joseph
accepted a chair at the University of Tennessee in Maryville Blount County as
Professor of Greek Theology and a professor o f the Arabic language. However, Najib
and Ibrahim returned to New York by the 1890s and created the first Arabic
newspaper for the mahjar, Kawkab America.
The Arbeely family was considered to be the first Syrian family to immigrate,
but not the only.72 The Arbeelys were the most prominent family, but many more
Syrians migrated to the United States in pursuit of a better life in the 1880s. Syrians
were impressed by the American Presbyterian missionaries and the news of success
that the Arbeelys incurred in the United States. There were already nine hundred
Syrians in the city when a reporter of the New York Tribune recorded his surprise at
the ease the Syrian immigrants in Little Syria conversed with him in English in 1894.

70 N e w York D aily Tribune, June 2 0 ,1 8 8 1 .
71 Ibid

72 I b i d
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It was implied that the Syrian immigrants had learned English prior to immigration,
probably taught by the Presbyterian missionaries in Beirut’s “celebrated colleges.”73
The missionaries had not only shown their students the promise of American liberty,
but prepared them for migration by teaching them English. This article exemplifies the
small, but significant, impact the missionaries had on the first wave of immigration.
The Presbyterian missionaries were not the only American connections to
prompt the wave of Syrian immigrations. The United States’ first World Fair, the 1876
Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia, was attended by Ottoman-Syrian subjects.
Syrian merchants displayed everything Ottoman; from coffee, to cotton, to relics from
Jerusalem. These merchants returned to Syria with news of American economic
prosperity and opportunities, displaying America as the one big “Souq al-Hamidiyah”
or Damascus Bazaar.74 Souvenirs of the Philadelphia International Exposition were
kept by Syrian merchants. Iskandar Kort was one of these merchants and he kept
mementos, passing it down as an heirloom to his children, and is now in a family
archive.75 Mementos from the Exposition were shown to relatives and neighbors to
display the economic opportunities in the United States. The visual proofs further
spread the promise of United States immigration. While merchants in the Centennial
Exposition and the early immigrants continued to send back news of their experiences
and success in the Americas, more families were prompted to immigrate to the United
States, believing it to be the land of opportunity. News of the 1889 decision in to set a

73 "Colonists from Lebanon: Ways of Work and Living of the 900 Syrians in th e City" The N ew York
Tribune, April 2 2 , 1894.
74 Orfaela, 64.
75M em entos can be found in the Laila Kort Fam ily Archive in Jerusalem.
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world fair in Chicago in 1893 encouraged more migration. Syrian immigrants began
saving up to take a steamboat from Beirut port to London then to the United States.
Syrian migration to the United States reached a high in 1891, as merchants moved
down to prepare for the Chicago Exhibition of 1893.
The United States seemed much more favorable to the Syrians as the land of
opportunity compared to the deteriorating conditions within the Ottoman Empire. It
was promised to be a safe haven for Christians, who were disillusioned by the
sectarian tensions and Ottoman decline. The Arbeely family and other Syrian migrants
fled sectarian tensions in the Ottoman Empire. Many migrants were also hoping for
financial amelioration. While Syrian migrants adopted new American identities, they
retained their traditional sectarian identities. As the early immigrants settled in Little
Syria, they pursued their old ways o f life: keeping their distinct sectarian identities
while trying to build their independent churches.

Xenophobia and the Creation of a Syrian Identity in the Mahjar
Syrian migrants did not necessarily consider themselves as “Syrian” until after
the experience of migration and discrimination within their host countries. Identity and
pride were based upon family names and sectarian affiliations in the Syrian province.
The Syrian migrants were forced to superficially unite as a national group to survive.
To unite the migrant community, the cosmopolitan elite members of the Syrian
migrant community reproduced nationalist pride in their communities through cultural
means. In the 1890s, physical attacks from neighboring Irish immigrants in
Manhattan, New York led to the need for unity. In reaction to the Irish animosity and
American neglect, members of the migrant’s elite created the first Syrian newspaper in
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neighborhood, although most shared the same Catholic belief. Stories of Irish
immigrants filling stockings with flour to beat Syrians with it on Halloween are still
remembered by Irish immigrants.78 The harassment the Syrian immigrants suffered at
the hands of the Irish immigrants of Washington Street united them against these
aggressors. New York newspapers only picked up on the most heinous of these
incidents, usually resulting in hospitalization. The first article to describe one of these
fatal incidents was in October o f 1891, when an Irish trucker, Joseph Cunningham,
tried to run a wagon off the road which contained two Syrians, Abdo Namnam and
Habib Wahby. Cunningham swore at the two Syrians, then began severely beating
Namnam. He “slashed Namnam across the face with his whip” then “pounded him
severely, blackening his eye, and knocking him about the street.” When Wahby
attempted to intercede to protect his assistant, Cunningham used a heavy oak cart-rung
and hit Wahby with it, fracturing W ahby’s skull and killing him.79
There was no evidence of how the Syrian community felt about this incident,
because there were no publications to show the Syrian side of the situation. The New
York Daily Tribune and the authorities seemed to side with the Syrians as the Irish
immigrants indiscriminately attacked them. The American public displayed the
Syrians as a monolithic community without any sectarian divisions in this incident.
The second fatal incident reported in the New York newspaper was met with a
published reaction from the united Syrian community, who were appalled by the
continuance of unrestrained harassment by the Irish community.

78 Ibid page 85
79 "He Crushed in Wahby's Skull: The Fearful Force of th e Blow Which a Driver Aimed With a Cart-Rung
at a Syrian" N e w York Daily Tribune, October 24, 1891.
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On April 5th, 1982 around five o ’clock in the afternoon, a Syrian teenager was
walking down the intersection o f Rector Street and Washington Street in New York.
On the intersection, a drunken Irish immigrant yelled “Damn Syria!” and proclaimed
that Washington Street was for Ireland. The Irish immigrant then knocked the Syrian
immigrant on his back and began repeatedly punching him. Another Syrian immigrant
was passing by when he witnessed this sight. The newcomer tried to defend the Syrian
boy by prying the Irish man off of him. Events escalated quickly, as more Syrian and
Irish immigrants heard their screams and attempted to help their “countrymen.” Badre
Hallaby, a Syrian woman who lived on this intersection, ran out of her apartment to
see what the commotion was about. Nellie Whalen, an Irish prostitute, attacked
Hallaby with a brick, causing her hospitalization from near-fatal injuries. The street
fight ended with black eyes, broken noses, and teeth loss.80
A group of Syrian immigrants went to the New York Police Department
immediately after the skirmish. The group claimed that the Irish policemen were also
drunk and let the Irish “ruffians go.” The Syrian immigrants demanded protection for
all of the Syrian inhabitants of Washington Street. The Police Officers on duty, Flynn,
Lyons, Carey and Campbell, claimed to have not seen the fight. Collee David,
representing the Syrians, said that these policemen were drunk and let their
countrymen go. The justice who listened to both sides and advised that “Syria and
Ireland sign a treaty,” since it was clear that “Ireland arose and asserted herself’ while
“Syria objected.81 The American public and the New York Police Department

80 Najib Arbeely, "Local News" Kaw kab Am erica, April 1 5 ,1 8 9 2 . Translated by th e author.
81 "A Woman Threw th e Brick: First War Between Syrians and Irish- One of th e Injured May Die" the
Sun, April 5 ,1 8 9 2 , 5.
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encouraged the maintenance of these nationalist identities as exemplified by the
justice’s snarky remarks and the Sun's title of the event: “The First War Between
Syrians and Irish.” The national implication of this article shows how the divisions of
the Syrian community faded away for the defense of the community and the Syrian
country. The policemen who pretended not to see anything were also Irish, siding with
the Irish immigrants, and led to an outrage in the Syrian community.
This incident did not receive an immediate published reaction by the Syrian
immigrant public since the first Arabic newspaper was not published until April 15,
1892. However, in their first issue of Kawkab America, the Arbeely brothers addressed
these abuses by the Irish immigrants. The article presented the Syrian account of the
events, through the words of Najib Arbeely. The article ended with an appeal for the
Americans to treat the Syrian community with the same respect and hospitality that
was given to the American missionaries in the Syria.82 The united Syrian community
wanted protection against this “certain class of ruffians infesting the neighborhood,”
from the police. Najib Arbeely claimed that Irish migrants tortured them with
“molestations and persecutions that could hardly be expected from Barbarians.” The
diction Arbeely utilizes to describe the events of the street fight and the attacks by the
Irish migrants creates a juxtaposition between the disruptive monolithic Irish migrant
community and the peaceful monolithic Syrian migrant community. Arbeely achieves
the creation of a juxtaposition between the two communities by describing the Irish as
worse than barbarians and how the Irish “thugs” are harassing a peaceful Syrian
community, who had been nothing but friendly. The juxtaposition Arbeely creates was

82 Najib Arbeely, "Local News" Kowkab Am erica, April 1 5 ,1 8 9 2 . Translated by the author
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an attempt to present the civility and respectability of a monolithic Syrian migrant
community in order to demand American protection.83 Arbeely finds it ironic that the
American justice system would protect barbaric thugs rather than a peaceful
community and highlights this irony within the first issue of Kawkab America. The
publication of Kawkab America was a reaction to the injustices towards the whole
Syrian community, while the barbarous Irish were protected by the American justice
system.
Arbeely recognized that the injustice the Syrian migrants faced in New York
was due to nativist anxiety toward new migration and industrialization. The American
public believed that Syrians are uncivilized and dirty, unworthy of the American
justice system. Thus, Arbeely utilized Kawkab America as a tool to reconcile
xenophobia by running articles in English to teach the public about Syrians, since “it is
an undoubted fact that the western man does not understand the oriental.” The
newspaper attempted to reconcile the native’s anxiety by bridging the “wide gulf [that]
has separated the nations of the East from those of the West,” or between Americans
and Syrians. Arbeely’s publication of the newspaper was an attempt to prove to the
American public that Syrian migrants were civilized and worthy of the American
respect and protection via the justice system .84 The events of discrimination and lack
of justice in the diaspora created the need for the Syrian migrants to unite to give voice
to their imagined community and to quell Orientalist discrimination.

83 "Outrages on the Syrian Colony" Kaw kab Am erica, April 1 5 ,1 8 9 2 .
84 "Introduction" K aw kab Am erica, April 1 5 ,1 8 9 2 .
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Kawkab America constructed a collective national Syrian identity in Little
Syria, as the immigrants faced many challenges in the diaspora. The lived experience
of these immigrants were contoured by discrimination and violence due to the
prejudices fueled by Orientalism in the United States. It was necessary for the Syrians
to unite under a collective national identity against the Irish “ruffians” and the
American public who viewed them as uncivilized and unworthy of protection. Kawkab
America became the tool to construct this united nationalist identity and voice the
community’s concerns against the injustices it faced in the mahjar. The Arbeely
brothers became the representatives of the Syrian migrant community in order to
protect the community from foreign threats, giving rise to the cosmopolitan literary
elite within the mahjar. The newspaper also kept Syrian migrants connected to their
heritage and the events occurring in Ottoman Syria to maintain the connection of their
ancestral homeland. In these incidents, sectarian attempts to rebuild and strengthen
their sectarian churches/identities were set aside to unite as Syrians against thugs who
attacked the community and prejudiced policemen who neglected their safety.
However, the Syrian migrants were not unified under one national identity. They
continued to build and strengthen their respective churches, fragmenting their
/

community by reproducing sectarianism in the diaspora.

Reproducing Sectarianism in Little Syria
Until the 1890s, the Syrian immigrants did not have churches of their own, so
they had to adopt existing churches near Little Syria to service their spiritual needs.
All of the Syrian Catholic immigrants, Maronites, Melkites, and Roman Catholics,
attended services at St. Peter’s Church on Barclay Street. The Greek Orthodox Syrian
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migrants were scattered in different Russian and Greek Churches. This may appear
that the earlier wave of immigrants united in common cause of adopting a church, but
the immigrants maintained their sectarian and ritual distinctions in these American
Churches. Hitti stated that “clannishness or factionalism is therefore the most
pronounced feature of the Syrian character,” and not even migration would change
this.85 Although they may have prayed in the same church as each other, the
immigrants reconstructed their distinct services and their distinct identities in the
mahjar.
In 1891, Syrian migrants highlighted their distinct identities and fragmentation
to the American public through the media. This was first seen when the Sun published
an article about the “three unusual masses” that took place at St. Peter’s Catholic
Church. Instead of holding one service for all the Catholics, mass services were split
up for each Catholic rite; at nine o ’clock in the morning the Roman Catholics held
their mass service, then the Maronites held their service at ten o ’clock, proceeded by
the Melkite mass at eleven o ’clock. Apparently this arrangement with the Church was
common for 1890, since Maronite migrants used the basement of St. Peter’s Church
for their weekly Sunday services for the past year. The journalist distinguished the
difference between the immigrant sects, describing the Melkites as 300 “dark-skinned
and curiously attired” Syrians in this article, whereas the Maronites are identified
simply as Maronites.86 The description of the two rites displays the stark differences in
identity between the two sects as its members made it a point to clarify their

85 Hitti, The Syrians, 24
86 "The Unusual Masses: Roman Catholic, Syrian, and Maronite Services in One Day in St. Peter's
Church" the Sun, January 7 ,1 8 9 1 .
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differences to the journalist of the Sun. The Melkite immigrants described themselves
as Syrian Catholics, probably shortened to “the Syrians” for this article, whereas the
Maronite immigrants maintained their distinct identity. The Maronites maintained
their distinct identity because of the political dominance of the Maronite Church in
Mount Lebanon and Beirut. The strength of the Church gave them more confidence in
their identities. Also, it is noticeable that neither of these sects indicate that they are
Catholic, during a time of Catholic xenophobia in North Eastern Cities.
Although both the Melkite and Maronite sects had been holding services in St.
Peter’s Church, they remained separated. Each sect refused to part with their rituals,
forcing St. Peter’s Church to accommodate all three services in tight time slots until
they could build their own churches. The Melkite community made St. Peter’s Church
their own, led by the first Syrian priest who immigrated to Little Syria to lead the
congregation in 1889. The Sun reported that the Maronite immigrants were already
making plans of constructing a church on Rector Street, but they needed a leader to
enforce these plans.
Before the Syrian immigrants could construct their own churches, they had to
pave the way for their Syrian priests and bishops to migrate to New York and lead
their individual sectarian communities. Father Peter Kurkamaz and Father Joseph
Yazbek were summoned by the community in 1890 to create a Maronite congregation
and make plans to construct the first Maronite church on Rector Street.87 Kurkamaz
and Yazbek migrated to Little Syria in 1890, when the head of the Maronite

87 This church cam e to be called St. George's Church and it still stands on the intersection of Rector
Street and W ashington Street as one of th e very few remnants of Little Syria.
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community was commissioned to “minister to the spiritual wants of his countrymen in
this city,” by uniting the Maronite immigrants under one congregation and church.88
The Greek Orthodox community attempted to unify under one congregation
and church, but it did not take effect until 1895. Meanwhile, the Syrian Orthodox
migrants had to choose between Greek and Russian churches in the diaspora, which
divided the Syrian Orthodox community. There had been Syrian Greek Orthodox
priests who tried to establish themselves as unifiers and leaders of the community in
Little Syria prior to 1895, but the Syrian Orthodox migrant community could not
support a permanent priest due to its relatively small size and lack of funds. The first
Archimandrite, Constantine Tarazy, immigrated to New York in 1892 on his own
initiative, but the community could not fund him nor build a church. Thus, Tarazy was
forced to return to Damascus later that year.89 Another Archimandrite, Christopher
Jabara, attempted to establish himself in Little Syria the following year and was able
to establish a temporary church at the intersection of Cedar and Washington streets.
Jabara’s failure at unifying the Syrian Greek Orthodox Community was due to a
scandal he caused in the Archdiocese. He preached that Judaism, Christianity and
Islam were all part of one religion and published these sermons in Unity in Faiths and
Harmony in Religions: Based on the Ordinances o f the Old and New Testaments and
the Koran. Jabara went too far when he gave an address at the Chicago Exposition of
1893, in the Parliament of Religions, to spread this belief. He hoped to “remove all
causes of dissensions and antagonisms between the professors of faith in the Bible, the
T
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Gospel and the Koran.”90 In an interview with the Sun in 1893, he argued that
Christianity was the continuation of Judaism, and that Islam purified and fulfilled
Christianity.91These heretical views led to Jabara’s exile to Egypt.
Jabara’s episode could be seen as a radical attempt to unify the Syrian
immigrant community beyond sectarian divide. Jabara may have also been trying to
fight Western xenophobia, which at this time had manifested in anti-Semitism and
Orientalism. Jabara was educated in Russia and was the head of the Antioch
metochion in Moscow, which had been subject to anti-Semitist pogroms and
islamophobia in the wake of the Crimean War. There he witnessed Western
imperialism into Africa and the Ottoman Empire justified by religion. To cease further
imperialist violence, Jabara advocated for a World Council of Churches. He explained
how intertwined the three Abrahamic religions were, against the backdrop of religious
genocide and exilic migrations. His views caused him to be exiled from Russia by the
Metropolitan of Moscow. Jabara brought these views to Little Syria under his adopted
title of Patriarch of Antioch in attempt to establish sectarian unity amongst Syrians and
create the World Council of Churches, but Syrian immigrants rejected Jabara’s
message after the humiliating episode in Chicago. Jabara’s rise exemplifies how the
lack of established leadership in the small, dispersed Greek Orthodox Syrian
immigrant community allowed for an obscure radical priest to rise through the ranks to
leadership. If the congregation were larger and more concentrated, no priest deemed as

90 "Father Jibara of Syria: A Sojourner in th e Syrian Colony of This City in Trouble with the Authorities
of the Greek Church of Which He is an Archimandrite, Because of His Views- What He says of
Christianity and Islam" The Sun, Septem ber 1 7 ,1 8 9 3 .
91 Ibid

57

a radical would have been able to establish himself as the leader o f the congregation.
Jabara’s exile also shows the Syrian determination to maintain sectarianism in their
adopted homeland, with their refusal to accept the notion that all religions run parallel
to one another. After exiling Jabara, the Syrian Greek Orthodox community remained
scattered and without a leader.
There would not be a centralized Greek Orthodox community until 1895, when
Ibrahim Arbeely used his influence within the Orthodox Church to advocate for the
appointment and migration of a strong Syrian Archimandrite educated in Moscow.
Although the Arbeely family had much contact with the American Protestant
missionaries, they never put aside their sectarian Greek Orthodox identity. Hitti says
that this was common among Syrians who migrated because “the constituency of the
churches is so fossilized [in Syria], and the conception of church membership as a
social, or rather group affair, is so entrenched in the popular mind that no realignment
could be achieved with any degree of facility or ease.”92 Ibrahim had become a doctor
since immigrating to the United States and was elected President of the Benevolent
Syrian Orthodox Society. Hearing of Archimandrite Raphael Hawaweeny’s
achievements in Moscow, Ibrahim was impressed. Ibrahim wrote to Hawaweeny to
request his services in uniting and pastoring the Orthodox Syrian flock in Little Syria.
/

Members of the Benevolent Syrian Orthodox Society also wrote to Hawaweeny to
request his services in the mahjar for a monthly salary of fifty dollars.93 Ibrahim also
connected with the Russian Bishop of Alaska, who became interested in the growing

92 Hitti, The Syrians, 46
93 The Official Pronouncem ents 1.3 (1905), pp. 28-29, 45.
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Orthodox community in New York. At both Ibrahim and Bishop Nicholas’ requests
for a Syrian Bishop for the United States, the Russian Emperor agreed to appoint
Hawaweeny “to account for American churches and missions.”94
Hawaweeny was bom on November 20th, 1860, only months following the
conclusion of the 1860 Massacre. His parents were from Damascus, but had sought
refuge from the sectarian violence in Beirut, where Hawaweeny was bom. The
Hawaweeny family and the Arbeely family and many others had sought refuge in
Beimt during the conflict, but the Hawaweeny family returned to Damascus to raise
their son. The conflict had greatly affected his family upon their return to Damascus,
where his father was a merchant. In the late 1870s, Hawaweeny’s family was affected
by the downturn of the economy and were unable to pay for his tuition. Due to his
reputation in the parochial schools, Hawaweeny received sponsorship to study for
priesthood. Ironically, Jabara had arranged for Hawaweeny to attend the Patriarchal
seminary to study in Moscow. Hawaweeny actually replaced Jabara as the post of
head of the Antiochian metochion in Moscow, foreshadowing his takeover in Little
Syria.95
At the time of his appointment, he was teaching Arabic as a professor at the
Kazan Theological Academy in Moscow. Before leaving Moscow in November,
Hawaweeny gathered relics from Russia to furnish a new church in the mahjar. He
found the Syrian Greek Orthodox community fragmented in Little Syria: some had

94 "Minister for Syrians: Christian Church to be Filled by a Damascus Preacher" The N e w York Times,
Septem ber 1 5 ,1 8 9 5 .
95 For more information on Hawaweeny's life before immigrating to the United States se e Issa, "The
Life of Raphael Hawaweeny."
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neglected their religious duties and others had converted to other denominations.96
Hawaweeny had much to do to pastor his flock under one congregation. He
immediately went to work teaching, preaching, counseling, and constructing plans to
create a new church and graveyard site for his congregation. Within two weeks of his
arrival to Little Syria, Hawaweeny constructed and blessed a new chapel on 77
Washington Street under St. Nicholas’ patronage. He also became chief of the
Benevolent Society. To service his scattered congregation, Hawaweeny went on tours
to visit smaller Syrian Orthodox communities scattered across the mahjar, performing
marriages, baptisms, confessions, and celebrating Divine Liturgies. Meanwhile, he
began compiling the necessary Syrian Orthodox liturgical prayers and services in a
book called Al-taz ’ziyah al-haqiqiyyah fi as-salawat al-ilahiyyah, Hawaweeny hoped
that the book would strengthen the congregation and link the other communities to
Little Syria. He also began looking for priests to service the smaller Greek Orthodox
communities. Hawaweeny mended the fragmented Syrian Greek Orthodox
Community in the American mahjar, first in New York and then throughout the North
America. His efforts in the community and the fame he received threatened the
Maronite community, which led to a street riot by 1905.
The main priority for the Syrian immigrants after they began settling in the
mahjar was to rebuild their churches and create a united congregation under one
church. Although at first glance it may have seemed like they set aside their sectarian
differences to adapt to the United States, the immigrants remained divided by sect.
They tried to emulate the land they left by rebuilding their communities. First they

96 Nikolas Nahas, a l-M ira t al A ntakiyya f i A m irka shim aliyya (Beaumont: Al-Hoda Press, 1922).
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petitioned for priests to lead their communities, to lead the construction of Syrian
Churches in Little Syria to resemble the churches they left behind in Syria. The first
Arabic newspaper for the mahjar had some sectarian connotations, as the Arbeelys
sought to strengthen their Greek Orthodox community. Hitti claimed that this
adherence to their sect and church was because the place of worship is where Syrians
were educated; it was the center of their society, their protectorate, and their nation.
Hitti states that the rebuilding of the churches in the diaspora is only natural because
“the Syrians are loyal to their church because of the national aspect o f its character,
and it, therefore forms an integral part of the constitution of their community.”97

97 Hitti, The Syrians, 35.
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Sectarian Tensions along Washington Street
Accommodating Chain Migrations
The second wave of Syrian migration began in the middle of the 1890s, when
yearly recorded migrations were in the thousands.98 Syrians were encouraged to
migrate to the United States as successful traders and shopkeepers returned to their
villages to get married and/or to visit family. Returning migrants dressed lavishly and
showed off substantial profits, inciting chain migrations to the United States. The
Sultanate viewed mass migrations as evidence of discontent and worried about the
Ottoman image abroad, especially since Syrian beggars in Paris spoke of Ottoman
despotism and oppression against Christians. The Sultanate forbade emigration, thus
creating a smuggling enterprise to accommodate the chain migration of Syrians.
Smugglers cooperated with foreign maritime companies. Shipping agents, bond
holders, brokers, muleteers, rowers, hostel keepers and merchants created an
underground smuggling ring. Shipping lines employed brokers, who sent out agents to
recruit immigrants.99 Diasporic newspaper articles in Cairo’s al- M uqtataf and
Kawkab America also fostered chain migrations by describing benefits of American
citizenship.100
The movements of the Syrian migrants were more controlled as the emigration
business grew, usually deporting from Beirut to Marseilles. Hostels for Syrian
migrants were set up in the ports of Athens, Barcelona, Liverpool, Genoa, Trieste,

98 Issawi, Economic History o f the M id d le East a n d N orth Africa, 86.
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Cherbourg, and Le Hauvre, where tickets to North America and South America were
sold. The hostel owners kept up with the news of economic opportunities to give
advice on where to migrate. They sold the migrants initial trinkets to peddle in the
United States.101 Some migrants were misrouted to South America and Africa. Others
were turned away from the United States due to trachoma and were rerouted through
South America to cross the border. As immigration to the United States increased,
smuggling methods became more developed and professional.
To accommodate the growing numbers of Syrian migrants in the diaspora,
more Syrian newspapers were established to represent the variety of migrants. The
newspaper editors entered into competition with one another to gain influence in the
diaspora. The second wave of migration saw a decrease in attempting to educate
Americans about the Syrian migrants, as reality settled that the xenophobic
discrimination would not cease. In 1897, trachoma was classified as a loathsome and
contagious disease by the United States, fueling nativist backlash against migrants.
Because of the high instances o f trachoma among Syrian migrants, Syrians were
considered dirty and diseased. In St. Louis they were called niggers; in Charleston
they were called yellow. Other diasporic sites called them Turks, camel jockeys, and
dagos.
Syrian and South Eastern European immigrants were blamed for the increase
of poverty and criminality all over the diaspora.102 The way the immigrants dressed,
ate, and decorated their homes were all scrutinized by nativists. By the turn of the

101 Andrew Arsan, Interlopers o f Empire: The Lebanese Diaspora in Colonial French W est Africa (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014),79
102 Alfaro-Velcamp, 20

63

twentieth century, Panama and Costa Rica excluded Syrians from migrating to their
countries. In Haiti, Syrian storeowners were stoned on August 5th, 1905 and forcibly
expelled from the island. On September 23rd, 1905, the Sun printed a letter to the
editor from Reginald Williams where he calls the Syrian migrants undesirable in the
civilization progress of the United States. Williams also says the undesirable
foreigners the “degeneration of the native race” and that nothing would be more
patriotic than to remove the Syrian immigrants from New York. His solution was to
force the migration of the undesirable immigrants to the country side where they
cannot degenerate the superior race.103 William’s letter is a prime example of
xenophobia against the Syrian migrants. Acts of xenophobia alienated the Syrian
population in Little Syria. They responded by turning inwards and focusing on the
daily life of the Syrian community.

Early Diasporic Newspaper Conflicts
The Syrian migrants remained cognizant o f the political debates in the
Ottoman Empire through diasporic newspapers.104 To decrease competition, the
newspapers targeted their fragmented Syrian audience by affiliating themselves with
sectarian identities. The newspapers and the communities reflected the politics of
Ottoman Syria and the mutasarifiyya in Mount Lebanon. Syrian inhabitants in the
Ottoman Empire and throughout the diaspora were divided between the conservative
and liberal politics, pro- and anti- Kusa politics, and Syrian-Arab nationalism versus

103 Reginald H. Williams, "The Birth Rate is th e Explanation of Its Fluctuation Found in Economic
Causes?" The Sun, Septem ber 2 3 ,1 9 0 5 .
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Lebanese separatism. The pro-Kusa faction was considered to be a conservative
stance, hoping for the Kusa family to remain in the governor position after N a’um
Kusa’s governorship from 1892-1902. The Kusa family was allied with the Maronite
Church and the foreign consulates. The anti-Kusa faction were liberal Maronites and
Greek Orthodox Christians who challenged foreign interference in Mount Lebanon’s
economy.
The pro-Kusa and anti-Kusa factions did agree upon separation from the
Ottoman Empire, but the spread of nationalism manifested in different ways in Mount
Lebanon. Mount Lebanon saw the fragmentation of its community over Lebanese
separatism and Arab-Syrian nationalism. The Maronite Church constructed the theory
of a separate Christian Lebanon by emphasizing its loyalty to France and underlining
the differences between the Westernized Lebanese and the backwards ‘Arabs.’ The
Maronite Church built a foundation for Lebanese nationalism. The Church used the
atrocities of the 1860 massacres to advocate for French protection of Lebanese
Catholics against the Ottoman Muslims. The Church and the mutasarifiyya also
desired to expand their influence and incorporate Beirut and the Biqa’a Valley into
Mount Lebanon. This desire was to receive more revenue for the government since
Mount Lebanon’s own ports did not generate a significant sum. Inhabitants and
migrants of the Syrian province did not necessarily agree with the Maronite Church’s
political stance concerning Lebanon. Many in Little Syria called for a Syrian nation,
protesting that there was peaceful coexistence in the region among the sects prior to
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foreign interference.105 These various views were all reflected in the sectarian papers
in the diaspora.
As early as 1894, the sectarian affiliations of newspapers began as Al Asr was
created by 27 year old N a’um Mokarzel and 28 year old Najib M aloof to rival Kawkab
America. The latter did not have a sectarian affiliation, but was intended for the whole
Syrian community. In Najib M aloof was a local silk merchant in Little Syria and a sort
of a loan shark in the Syrian community. In 1894, Kawkab America published an
article detailing how M aloof struck his neighbor, Habib Patrikian, for failing to repay
his debts. The article reproached Maloof for his violence and encouraged Syrian
migrants to handle disputes like Americans. Maloof sued the Arbeely brothers for
libel, claiming that Kawkab America's article detailing M aloof s recent quarrels
degraded his character, making him similar to “vagabonds, rogues and disturbers of
the peace.” Furthermore, M aloof claimed that Arbeely slandered M aloof s name
because he refused to recommend Kawkab America to Syrian migrants in the
colony.106 M aloof said this to save his reputation and his business from the impacts of
the article. To counter the influence of Kawkab America, he decided to create his own
newspaper, al-Asr.
Maloof and Mokarzel began publishing al- Asr to attack the Arbeely brothers,
insisting that they deceived and stole from the Syrian community. By September of
the same year, Najib and Ibrahim Arbeely sued M aloof for libel. Judging from the
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numerous libel lawsuits between him and various editors, the remarks to the American
press was an attempt to generate business by clearing his name. Besides their business
ambitions, Maloof and Mokarzel hoped to influence the growing Syrian migrant
population. Mokarzel recognized the inherent differences along Washington Street,
where “good industrious Syrians” and “lazy Syrians” coexisted. He noted the
differences in sects, characteristics, work ethics, and though processes.107
Mokarzel desired to civilize, Westernize, and unify the Syrian community
through his own newspaper. He did not think Kawkab America was effective in
retaining tradition Syrian values while teaching the migrant population how to become
more civil. Mokarzel and M aloof recognized that press constructed the Syrian
community in the mahjar through printed descriptions of political organization. The
press also developed educational and financial structures and spread national
narratives, creating the imagined diasporic community. Maloof understood that the
diasporic press could hurt his business, so he sought to influence it to generate
business by partnering with Mokarzel. Mokarzel was against the political
organizations that the Arbeely brothers represented. Kawkab America tended to be
pro-Ottoman and pro-Orientalist, which Mokarzel, as influenced by the Maronite
Church, believed to be backwards and barbarous.108 Mokarzel and M aloof created
newspapers to rival Kawkab America, because they did not agree with their politics
nor their sectarian affiliation. M aloof and Mokarzel were staunch supporters of the
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Maronite Church and the French Consulate.109 In fact, when discussing Arab history,
Mokarzel contributes the Arab’s knowledge of science to the French missionaries
rather than discussing the Islamic Renaissance during the Middle Ages.110
Mokarzel was the main instigator of many newspaper wars in the mahjar in the
first decade of the twentieth century and instigated the newspaper war which led to the
1905 riots. Whenever the views he presented in Al-Hoda were not accepted by others,
he fought his opponent until they were defeated. This mentality was troublesome for
the minority community.111 Mokarzel immigrated to the United States in 1890 and
created his own newspaper, Al-Hoda, when his brother, Salloum, joined him in 1898.
The newspaper did not determine a sectarian affiliation when it was first created. In
its’ first issue, Mokarzel presented al-Hoda as an independent paper for all Syrians, to
rival newspapers editors loyal to competing empires for influence in Syria (i.e. British,
Ottoman, Russian, France).112 Since al Hoda was meant for all Syrians in the diaspora,
Mokarzel made his newspaper competitive by publishing it bi-weekly, on Wednesdays
and Saturdays. To compete with the Egyptian press which Mokarzel considers the
“mother of the mahjar,” al-Hoda reported on Syrians migrants in Canada, Mexico,
Brazil, and Colombia.113 However, impartiality did not last long as Mokarzel
maintained close relationships with French officials, particularly George Picot, who

109 Naff, 320
110 In an article in A l Hoda, February 2 6 ,1 9 0 4
n l Michael Suleiman, "The Mokarzels' Contribution to the Arabic-Speaking Community in th e United
States," A rab Studies Q uarterly 21 (1999): 72.
112 "Articles Section" Al-Hoda, February 2 2 ,1 8 9 8 .
113 In an article in A l Hoda, February 2 7 ,1 9 0 4 .

68

later helped publish the Sykes-Picot Treaty.114 Although N a’um tried to keep al-Hoda
on an “independent path,” his competitive nature led to his decision to affiliate alHoda with his Maronite sect four years after the establishment of his newspaper. This
was due to the publication of a rival Maronite paper, Al-Sakhra, created under the
leadership of Bishop Yazbek for the Maronite Syrian community. To defeat this rival
newspaper, Mokarzel printed articles accusing that the staff of al-Sakhra were not true
representatives of Maronites, but were Greek Orthodox. He accused the “dishonest”
staff of intending to split the Maronite community.115
To further overcome the competition with al-Sakhra, Mokarzel decided to
publish his newspaper daily by August 1902. Mokarzel was brutal in his attempts to
decrease competition in newspapers and the influence of the community, slandering
his competition, even if they were former colleagues. When one of his writers, Amin
al- Gharib, decided to create a Syrian nationalist newspaper, al-Muhajir (the
Immigrant), he became subject to Mokarzel’s attacks.116 Mokarzel’s intentions were to
destroy the integrity of the competition, so that he could continue to influence the
Maronite Syrian community. By 1905, this mentality reproduced sectarian tensions in
the diaspora when he attacked the Greek Orthodox Syrian migrant community, after
first attacking their bishop, Rafael Hawaweeny. The three main enemies of al-Hoda in
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the first decade became al- Muhajir, Mira ’at- al Gharb, and Syrian nationalist Bishop
Hawaweeny.

The Reproduction of Sectarianism in Little Syria
The Syrian migrant community was described as peaceful prior to 1905, with
the exception of the few court cases. The year 1904, in particular, was a peaceful time
for the Syrian migrants in the United States, as both the Maronite and the Greek
Orthodox sects supported the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War to promote the
prevalence of Christendom. Mira ’at al-Gharb, al-Hoda and the Bishop allied
themselves with the Russians, and raised money for the Russian Christians to defeat
the Japanese pagans.117 Good spirits were furthered by Hawaweeny’s appointment to
Bishop of the Syrian Greek Orthodox Church of the United States of America,
Mexico, and Canada.
There appeared to be peaceful relations among the bourgeoisie of the Syrian
migrants and their newspapers, as they commandeered the influence of their respective
communities. Mokarzel had noted that Mira ’at al-Gharb was a colleague of al-Hoda
when he congratulated Hawaweeny on his appointment to the American Bishopric. He
called the appointment “a rare and wonderful occasion” for Hawaweeny.118 However,
the peace between the Maronites and the Greek Orthodox Syrian migrants did not last
into 1905, as the cosmopolitan elite began resenting Hawaweeny’s growing influence
in the community. Businessmen used the fragmentation o f the Syrian migrant
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community to destroy their competition. They paid the newspapers to publish
slanderous articles to crush their business rivals.
Bishop Hawaweeny created his own bi-monthly journal, al-Kalimah, in
January 1905, using print capitalism to unite the Syrian migrants in the diaspora.
Hawaweeny justified the publication of Al-Kalimah to transmit the word of salvation
and “love of the spiritual ministry to all Syrians, especially to the children of our
community that are spread over our entire God protected Archdiocese. For because we
cannot perform this spiritual ministry verbally towards our spiritual children due to
their diffusion over places far away from the center of the Archdiocese.” 119 The
magazine was intended for primarily Greek Orthodox Syrians scattered throughout the
mahjar, but Hawaweeny also intended it for all Syrians in the diaspora. He hoped to
forge a collective identity with even those further away in the mahjar through the
journal’s “spirit of love.”120 Unlike the other Arabic newspapers at this time,
Hawaweeny emphasized in print that al Kalimah would avoid “personal
allegations/ridicule and avoid all political matters.”121
Hawaweeny kept his word and remained neutral in political matters. Instead,
he kept busy for most of the year building a Greek Orthodox Church for Syrian
migrants in Massachusetts, the first Russian Orthodox Church. He travelled
throughout the United States to perform wedding ceremonies. As the figurehead of the
Greek Orthodox community in the Americas, Hawaweeny easily wielded the greatest
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influence in the diaspora. Businessmen tried to manipulate that influence to further
their business and political ambitions, but Hawaweeny refused to aid these men. Some
elite members in the mahjar saw Hawaweeny’s resistance as snobbery and it created
enemies in the diaspora. These enemies were determined to defeat his influence in the
diaspora, with the same methods they used to undermine their business rivals.
Slanderous newspaper articles to promote business and political interests in the
diaspora continued until a circular in Little Syria demanded that editors and publishers
stop publishing paid articles attacking Syrian personalities. According to the American
newspapers, the circular was published by the Champagne Glass Club (Jami ’at alAkdh), a group of fifteen business men in Little Syria led by M aloof who wanted to
protect their businesses. Al-Hoda supported these attempts, denouncing Mira ’at alGharb for printing unnecessary slanderous words which disgusted the Syrian
community.122 Some diasporic newspapers agreed to stop publishing slanderous
articles, but Hawaweeny refused to get involved or sign the petition. His refusal
slanderous articles about Hawaweeny published in al-Hoda. The earliest attack on
Hawaweeny’s character came in August 1905, where al-Hoda published that
Hawaweeny was leading his followers down the evil path and called him a snob.123
Hawaweeny refused to respond to the articles, attempting to maintain his stance that as
Bishop, his “paths do not lead [him] to politics.”124
Although Hawaweeny refused to respond to the slander, members of his
congregation did not stand idly by. The editor of the weekly journal Mira ’at al-Gharb,
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Najib Diab, responded to the articles to protect Hawaweeny’s reputation. Diab’s
response led to a series of slanderous articles about Maloof, Mokarzel, Hawaweeny
and Diab in both newspapers. The slanderous contents of newspaper articles had
gotten so out of control that Syrian migrants in New York told American reporters that
they had forbidden their wives and daughters from reading the diasporic newspapers
altogether.125 Hawaweeny spoke against the newspaper fight after friends of al-Hoda
begged him to put an end to the squabble.126 On August 23rd, M aloof wrote a scathing
article in al-Hoda in response to Hawaweeny’s demand to end the newspaper war.
M aloof reminded Hawaweeny of his “obligation as a servant to the people,” and that
he is no better than the people he serves and needs to stop acting like it. He accused
Hawaweeny of being two-faced with double standards and that Diab is Hawaweeny’s
parrot, contending that Mira ’at al Gharb is run by the Bishop. Among the accusations
listed against Hawaweeny, M aloof blames Hawaweeny for ruining his enemies, such
as Hana Abdulnoor and N a’um Mokarzel.127 M aloof claimed that Hawaweeny stated
that he wanted to prevent the people from reading al-Hoda.128 M aloof s claims were
attempts to reverse the Bishop’s influence in the mahjar, using the same methods he
attempted a decade previously with the Arbeely brothers.
M aloof s desperation was transparent to Hawaweeny. Hawaweeny hoped to
calm his churchmen, who saw M aloof s article as an attack upon the entire Greek
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Orthodox congregation. An attack upon the character of the Greek Orthodox Bishop
reignited underlying sectarian tensions in Little Syria. Hawaweeny called a meeting
that night in the basement of his church in Brooklyn to prevent violent reaction to
M aloof s article. He told the New York Tribune that he asked his churchmen to forgive
Maloof and Mokarzel, and not pay attention to the attacks.129 The Maronites feared
that the gathering was a conspiracy. On August 26th M aloof and a group of Maronite
businessmen from the Champagne Glass Club submitted a formal appeal to Police
Commissioner McAdoo to protect them from Hawaweeny and his violent Syrian
Greek Orthodox followers. They claimed to have received threatening letters after
Hawaweeny’s meeting. The Champagne Glass Club members also claimed that this
meeting was to demand the churchmen to defend their Bishop’s honor and the
churchmen took up “Oriental custom” for the congregation to swear to lay down their
lives for their Bishop. Maloof manipulated Orientalism among the American Press in
order to counter Hawaweeny’s influence in the diaspora, alienating the Syrian
population further from the American public.
These events led to more newspaper articles slandering Maloof, Diab,
Mokarzel and Hawaweeny in the next couple weeks. Sectarian differences were
manipulated to motivate their readers to choose a side in the newspaper battles.
Maloof was a main advertiser in al-Hoda, and was Mokarzel’s partner in their last
newspaper. Naturally, Mokarzel sought to defend M aloof s reputation to the Maronite
population. Mokarzel reminded his readers that M aloof is known throughout the
United States as respectable, moral, and peaceful. He states that Mokarzel was unfairly
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attacked for asking newspaper editors to print solely honest and just articles.
Mokarzel’s article indicates that Diab and the Bishop were corrupt in their refusal to
get involved with M aloof and the Champagne Glass Club. In the same article,
Mokarzel accuses Diab of debasing himself by publishing articles which disrespect
Syrian women.130 Mokarzel calls for Mira ’at al- Gharb to be shut down for Diab’s
abusive attacks on Syrian families.
The tensions between the newspapers’ editors were reflected in the Syrian
community while acts of sectarian violence began to simmer. Hawaweeny had been
threatened with assassination as well. He reported that he did “not dare to leave [his]
home unaccompanied at night” for a couple of weeks.131 On September 16th, 1905,
tensions led to potential violence when three migrants from Zahle drew weapons upon
Maronite men. The guns were taken by other peaceful Zahle men, but they were not
able to prevent one of these angry men from assaulting a “generous Maronite”
member o f the community, who was not named. Mokarzel placed the full
responsibility of these actions upon Hawaweeny, for encouraging “idiots to consider
themselves brave vigilantes.”132
By September 18th, skirmishes turned into a full riot between two hundred
Maronites and Greek Orthodox on Pacific Street. That day a skirmish took place on
Washington Street as three Maronite merchants from the Champagne Glass Club
attacked the Greek Orthodox Merchant Nicola Abu Samara. The police arrested
Maloof, Awad, and Gazal for disturbing the peace. Abu Samara was a close friend of
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Hawaweeny, so rumors spread about an assassination on the Bishop.133 The skirmish
of that day gave way to a full out riot on Pacific Street that night. Mokarzel reported
that the shooting began around 9:30 pm with forty-five to fifty shots fired on the
intersection of Clinton and Pacific Street. He described that the residents left their
houses crying and shouting on the street due to the commotion. Men began fighting
while the perpetrators ran away from the scene. Not too long after the sound, a
wounded Abdo Diab Ashkouti knocked on Mokarzel’s door for sanctuary. A bullet
had scraped the side of his left thigh, leaving two wounds. Mokarzel explained to have
welcomed him “as a brother and friend” and cared for his wounded left thigh, until a
doctor showed up to dress the wounds. The police appeared and arrested six men,
among them was the Bishop.134 Police deputy Mallon chased after Hawaweeny in full
sprint for a block.135 Policeman Butler reported that Hawaweeny threw aside a pearl
handled revolver before Mellon caught him.136
Afterwards the police asked for Ashkouti’s report of the incident, who claimed
to have been walking to Mokarzel’s house alone with his cane. As Ashkouti turned
onto the intersection of Pacific Street and Clinton Street, he saw two Syrian men
walking up to Mokarzel’s house on 137 Pacific Street and another three men passing
by behind them, one of the men having a long beard. When the men saw Abdo, the
bearded man proclaimed him to be an enemy and yelled for his companions to kill
Ashkouti. Shots were immediately fired. According to Ashkouti, at least ten more
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armed men walked by with guns and also began shooting. Ashkouti goes on to narrate
a heroic tale of his survival; he told reporters that he broke his cane after hitting three
/

men with it. Afterwards he began grabbing men from the mob to guard himself, only
to toss them aside and replace his human shields. His goal was to get to Mokarzel’s
doorstep. Ashkouti did not confirm that the bearded man who initiated the attack was
Bishop Hawaweeny, since he “did not know the Bishop personally,” but suggested
that it could have been him.137
Mokarzel admitted to not knowing the full details of the incident, since he
remained in his house during the riot. He used the American newspapers and
Ashkouti’s report to try to piece together what happened. Mokarzel even translated the
newspaper articles from the Times, the Sun, The New York Tribune, The Herald, and
the World concerning the incident, to allow his readers to determine what happened
themselves.138 McAdoo misinterpreted the incident as an attack on Mokarzel’s house
in his police report, allowing the American press to believe that Mokarzel was
involved. Mokarzel believes McAdoo’s misunderstanding of the events were due to
rumors that had been circulating the past month that the Greek Orthodox Syrians
threatened to kill Mokarzel and other Maronite members of the Champagne Glass
Club. The police report and the American press believed Hawaweeny led an armed
attack against Mokarzel.
In the police report, Hawaweeny and a few of his friends appeared upon
Mokarzel’s door step on 137 Pacific Street, where the Champagne Glass Club was
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holding a meeting. According to the New York Times, “the minute the Hawaweeny
party entered the fight began” in the parlor and then out into the street.139 The Sun
reported that the two factions held an hour long meeting before the fight broke out.140
The New York Daily Tribune reported that no one entered Mokarzel’s residence, and
as soon as he saw and heard the men coming, Mokarzel “fled down the backstairs to
safety,” while his friends prepared themselves to receive the aggressive visitors.141
Mokarzel contends that no conference was held between the two factions and no one
entered his residence during the incident. Although Mokarzel denied that Hawaweeny
and his followers attempted to assassinate him, he still blamed the riot on
Hawaweeny’s bad rationale in his teachings. A follow-up article in al-Hoda insisted
that Hawaweeny’s “hissing” created the factionalism and animosity between the
Maronites and the Greek Orthodox Syrians, splitting the Syrian migrant community.142
Hawaweeny denied any part in the incident, believing that it is just another
way for his enemies to attempt to hurt him. Hawaweeny claimed that he and a group
of his parishioners went to visit Samara to pray with him after the earlier attack.143
When the shooting began, the Bishop claimed to have been peacefully passing by,
unarmed. According to his sister-in-law, Hawaweeny saw the gathering of men who
passed and insulted him, but he kept walking until they shot at him .144 Hawaweeny
explained to reporters of The World that he ran because he believed that the riot was a
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“feigned pistol duel” with the hope of assassinating the Bishop with a stray bullet.145
He claimed that he had no idea how to use a gun since he had lived in a convent most
of his life. Hawaweeny spent the night in Butler Street Station, after the magistrate
refused him bail to maintain the peace and protect Hawaweeny.
The next day the officer who caught Hawaweeny, Mallon, claimed that the
Bishop shoved the revolver in his face and snapped it twice after he saw the Bishop
fire the gun at others. This new declaration contradicting his police report that all he
saw was Hawaweeny running and tossing aside a weapon.146 The contradiction in
Mallon’s reports shed some public sympathy for Hawaweeny. Police Commissioner
McAdoo reported to have deemed M allon’s charge “preposterous.” 147 The New York
newspapers changed their minds about Hawaweeny, believing that a bishop could not
be capable of such violence after interviewing the Greek Orthodox residents of Little
Syria. The Sun, The New York Daily Tribune, and the World detailed the libel case
against Mokarzel, Maloof, and three others from the Champagne Glass Club that
followed Hawaweeny’s night in jail. McAdoo and Inspector Cross found M aloof and
M okarzel’s August appeal that the Bishop had incited his followers to attack them
baseless. The American newspapers and public now saw Mokarzel and M aloof s
actions as “Oriental” to ask for protection against a man they planned to attack.148
Orientalist against the whole Syrian community is clear throughout the American
press. New York newspapers first believed that the Bishop would call a meeting to
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incite an “oriental” ritual to ask his followers to give their lives for him and then
saying that lie was an oriental custom. The sectarian strife had been attributed to
orientalism on both sides due to xenophobia.
The Sun reported that the attacks upon Hawaweeny’s reputation was due to the
Maronites’ jealousy of Hawaweeny’s success with the construction of his church and
cemetery.149 It was more than Greek Orthodox structures that fueled Maloof and
Mokarzel’s jealousy; they were threatened by Hawaweeny’s influence over the
diaspora. Maloof and Mokarzel were unable to pass their circular without his
signature. Hawaweeny made enemies through his neutrality in the social, commercial
and political fights among the elite men. Maloof emphasized that Hawaweeny’s stance
of neutrality was an indication of his being two-faced. M aloof and Mokarzel had
extensive experience with the American press and the police. They used this
experience to manipulate the American public and try to break the Bishop’s influence
over the Syrian community. In attacking the Bishop, Mokarzel and M aloof reproduced
sectarianism among the Greek Orthodox and Maronites in their communities. Men
like Abdo Ashkouti fought to defend these elite leaders and their sect.
The factionalism that the diasporic newspapers sparked caused tension and
more riots throughout the next three months in Little Syria. Hawaweeny appealed to
McAdoo for protection against the threats of the Champagne Glass Club. The Russian
Consul General also asked for protection for the Bishop in the form of a guard.150
Interestingly, while Hawaweeny and the Greek Orthodox Syrian migrants had the
I
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Russian Consul General advocate for them, a French lawyer, Charles Lebarbier
defended Mokarzel. This court case reflected Syrian politics, with the Russian
consulate interfering in Ottoman affairs, claiming protection over the Greek Orthodox
Ottoman subjects and the French claiming protection over the Maronites. Ottoman
sectarianism and international politics had been reflected in Little Syria due to a feud
fueled by merchants trying to protect their businesses. Whether Hawaweeny or
Mokarzel were directly involved with the shooting on September 18th is not as
important as the fact that their strife in the Syrian diasporic media led to a sectarian
conflict in Little Syria. Syrian men were willing to kill for their sectarian group and
leader, even if not directly asked to. Sectarianism was imported and reproduced in the
Syrian diaspora, as more important than a Syrian ancestry.
The court case only fueled sectarian violence in Little Syria, as the newspapers
continued to attack each other. By October, Hawaweeny was presented as a murderer
in al-Hoda. Mokarzel claimed that Hawaweeny hired assassins to kill him and Maloof
throughout the month. These articles kept fueling the tension in Little Syria,
continuing the skirmishes and charges among the residents. On September 21st 1905,
three Greek Orthodox migrants residing on Washington Street attacked Maronite John
Bontross on Rector Street with three-foot clubs.151 On October 11th 1905, M aloof sued
Diab for libel. More charges and counter-charges between the Syrians continued to
trouble Magistrate W ahle’s court. Wahle became impatient with the constant
skirmishes by October 23rd during M aloof s countercharge that a Syrian assaulted him.
Wahle interrupted the case and lectured the three hundred Syrians who appeared in his
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courtroom to make charges and/or represent their faction. He advised the men to settle
the complaints among themselves and make peace with their neighbors.152 Maloof
replied that he is afraid for his life because the Bishop had put the price of five
thousand dollars on his head. Wahle invited M aloof to stay with him to calm him
down and adjourn the court. Officer Oscar Finn helped file the men out of the court
room. Unfortunately, as soon as the men filed out of the court room, another riot took
place on Washington Street.
Twenty-five year old Hafez Abdulmalek left his job at the Mira ’at al-Gharb
office at six o ’clock that evening. Due to the neighborhood tensions and his
occupation, Abdulmalek requested that Officer Finn escort him to his residence.
Maronite grocer Moussa Abalan stopped them on Liberty Street and called another
Patrolman over to arrest Abdulmalek for possessing a whip. This scene attracted an
angry crowd, as Patrolman Moran arrested Abdulmalek and took him to the Church
Street Station, where he was discharged. As soon as Abdulmalek was discharged,
revolvers and knives were drawn and chaos erupted. The fighting among the Syrian
migrants ensued for an hour and four men were stabbed, including Abalan. The New
York Times described the rioters as “wild-eyed” and “baring teeth,” as if they were
barbarians rather than humans.153
Although this was the last major riot in Little Syria, it led to more charges and
counter-charges. Abalan charged another grocer, Greek Orthodox Tony Sabi with
stabbing him. Other businessmen hurt their competitors in the same fashion. What
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started as a war of words between literary cosmopolitan elite figureheads had
reconstructed itself as a sectarian battle for merchants. The merchants used the chaos
to also try to eliminate competition in the mahjar, justifying their actions through
sectarian languages. Maloof, Mokarzel, and Diab may not have been present at the
two riots that took place, but their battle of words had precipitated and caused the
migrant community to faction. When Hawaweeny became involved in the newspaper
attacks, the factions justified themselves through sectarianism. Sectarianism was
reproduced through print capitalism and divided the Syrian community. Skirmishes
and rows continued in Little Syria, with the American newspapers constantly viewing
the violence as a continuation of the September 18th riot.
Although it seemed that the newspaper editors made their peace with each
other and with Hawaweeny, they continued to represent their sectarian factions up
until 1920, when Diab and Mokarzel both attended the Paris Peace Conference to
advocate for two different visions of nationalism. Diab hoped to influence the Western
leaders to help construct a separate Syrian nation-state, whereas Mokarzel petitioned
for the creation of a separate Lebanese nation-state with a Maronite majority and
French protectorate. Mokarzel’s desire to influence the Maronites in the diaspora
shifted to trying to create a separate nation for the Maronites, led by the Church and
influenced by the French.
The migrants claimed to have left the Ottoman Empire and sectarian strife,
only to reproduce it amongst themselves in their adopted homelands. The reproduction
of sectarianism was fueled by print capitalism in the diaspora. The cosmopolitan
literary elite migrants competed for influence in the Syrian mahjar through newspaper
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articles. They slandered their enemies to wield their influence. When Hawaweeny was
appointed Bishop of the Americas, he became a target. When Hawaweeny became a
target, the attacks took a sectarian coloring, causing riots in the streets between
Maronite and Greek Orthodox merchants and peddlers.
Sectarian-based riots in the United States was not a new phenomenon by the
twentieth century. Philadelphia had seen riots in the 1844 Kensington riots, when
native Evangelical Protestants attacked Irish Catholic immigrants. Newspaper wars
were also common in the United States and was prominent in the Arabic newspapers
of Little Syria. New York itself was riddled with factional riots in other migrant
communities. The Catholic and Protestant Irish fought among themselves; the Chinese
migrants were tom between the feuding On Leong Tong and Hip Sing Tong families.
The Italian migrants were divided between their place of origin (Northern Italian vs.
Sicilians) and Sicilian mafia gangs. However, rioting was rare for “friendly” Syrian
community.
The first decade of the twentieth century saw a shift from the facade of a
national Syrian diasporic community to the further fragmentation of the Syrian
immigrant community along sectarian along, fermented by the competition of Arabic
sectarian-affiliated newspapers. The reproduction of sectarianism in Little Syria was a
reaction to the xenophobia confronted in the diaspora. The violence o f its reproduction
further proved to the American public that Syrians were uncivilized. The New York
Times referred to the Syrian migrants as “wild-eyed” and frenzied.154 Violence in the
immigrant communities reinforced the American xenophobia of its South Eastern
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European and Asian migrants. It justified their beliefs that these new migrants are
barbarous and would degrade the population. When reporting upon the riots, American
newspapers made the Syrian migrant population look to be uncivilized, led into moral
decay by an uncivilized Bishop. American newspapers agreed that the rioting in the
Syrian colony was worse than the Tong family feuds. American reporters employed
orientalism and described the Syrians as dark-skinned and animal-like, showing their
bias about the Syrians. The violent sectarianism in the diaspora only justified nativist
xenophobia which ultimately led to exclusionary laws to prevent further Syrian
migrations to the United States.
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Conclusion
Syrian migrants escaped religious economic inequality and sectarian tensions
by immigrating to the United States, “the land of opportunity”. Syrian migrants were
lured by the promise of American economic opportunities and safety for Christians
that the American Presbyterian missionaries and the expositions of 1876 and 1893
presented to them. These opportunities appeared more favorable than the land-andcrop-deprived Mount Lebanon regions, the burden of heavy taxation, and the
competition against cheaper European goods that the immigrants had experienced in
the Ottoman Empire. The deprived economic conditions of Syria combined with the
memories of the brutality of the 1860 massacres were pivotal for the Syrian decision
to immigrate to the United States, a land in which Christians can prosper. The Arbeely
family’s immigration is the prime example of how the conditions of the Ottoman
Empire allowed the Arbeelys to be lured by the promise of economic opportunity and
lack of sectarian strife that the American Presbyterian missionaries presented to them.
Other immigrants listened to these promises, and were convinced by the letters from
migrants and merchants who attended the 1876 and 1893 United States Expositions.
The letters confirmed that the United States was the land of opportunity.
The Syrian migrants were welcomed with xenophobia when they arrived in the
United States. The migrants experienced Irish-American harassment in their colony,
causing them to unite together for the first time as Syrians, or an imagined community
which connected them with the Syrians in the Ottoman Empire. They put aside their
differences to demand protection from the authorities for their entire community in
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Little Syria in 1892. The experience of xenophobia led to the creation of an imagined
Syrian diasporic community as newspapers and family networks kept the immigrants
connected to Syria. The community turned inwards to focus on itself and daily life in
Little Syria, to survive the xenophobia their host colony received them with. By the
twentieth century, the small colony of three hundred Syrian migrants increased ten
fold, increasing the need for more newspapers to better represent the diverse
population.
Although the Syrian immigrants sought to escape the sectarian strife that they
experienced within Syria, under Ottoman governance, they reproduced the same
sectarian tensions they escaped through print capitalism. Immediately after settling in
Little Syria, migrants began works to recreate the life they left behind. They united
and strengthened their congregations, financed for the immigration of priests to tend to
the needs of these congregations, and built churches to represent their different rites.
They refused to intermingle, even when attending the same church for religious
observance on Sundays, remaining fragmented in the mahjar.
The cosmopolitan literary elite manipulated sectarian loyalties, and
reconstructed a different sort of sectarianism in the diaspora as they fought amongst
each other for influence over the diaspora. Maloof and Mokarzel worked together to
slander their enemies, to defeat them. These sectarian divisions led to newspaper wars,
which escalated to street riots between merchants and two hundred Syrian men on the
precept of sectarianism when al-Hoda attacked the Greek Orthodox Bishop of the
Americas, R afael Hawaweeny in 1905. For three months, tensions between the
Maronite and Greek Orthodox were high as both factions sought to defend their
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sectarian leaders and their businesses. The riots of 1905 fragmented the Syrian
population along sectarian lines permanently in the diaspora, although they presented
themselves to the xenophobic public as united Syrians.
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